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PREFACE
The following thesis aims at discerning the attitudes
of Sir Bartle Frere as a guide to British colonial and admin
istrative thought during the Victorian Period.

By doing

this, it becomes possible to ascertain the impact of the
administrator on British colonial' and foreign policy.
Appreciation for help in preparing this thesis must
go first of all to Dr. A. Stanley Trickett, who provided
the inspiration and did so much to guide it to a fruitful
conclusion.

Dr. Frederick Adrian is to be thanked for his

helpful criticism of the text.

Mrs. Elizabeth Laird of The

G-ene Eppley Library must be accorded a special tribute for
the help she gave in procuring many of the works used.
Finally, there is my wife, Sheila, who did the typing
throughout.
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CHAPTER I
SIR BARTLE FRERE— A SUMMARY OF HIS LIFE1
Henry Bartle Edward Erere was born on 29 May 1815 in
Brecknockshire, Wales.

Following early schooling at Bath, he

entered the East India Company college at Haileybury in 1832
to prepare for a career as a Company servant in India.

At

Haileybury, Frere was imbued with the economic philosophy of
the day, which stipulated that the correct method of economic
development was free trade, with the least possible government interference.

2

Haileybury also instilled in its students

a belief in the more,! and political superiority of Br.^' Lish
rule in India.

Territory under che control of the British

East India Company at that time was extensive.

It included

the entire east coast, the west coast,, from Goa to Travancore,
and Bombay with its island of Salsette.
The Ganges valley
i
to the Upper Jumna, with the exception of Oudh, was under
.

1
Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter
has been taken from Robert Kennanay Douglas, f!Frere, Sir
Henry Bartle Edward,11 Dictionary of National Biography. VII,
697-706. Hereinafter referred to as D . N . B .
^John Straehey, The End of Empire (New York:
House, 1959), 56.

Random

^George D. Bearce, British Attitudes Towards India.
1784-1858 (Oxford: University Press, 196l), 122.’ Herein
after referred to as Bearce, Attitudes.

its sway.
1849-^*

The Sind was annexed in 1834 and the Punjab in

In 1834 Prere assumed his first position in-the

Company’s ranks as a writer in the Bombay Presidency.

A

year later he became an assistant revenue commissioner.
The career of Bartle Prere in the years from 1842 to
1866 was a story of great success, tarnished by failure at
the last moment, as he rose in the hierarchy of Indian govern
ment.

It was his good fortune to become personal secretary

to the Governor of the Bombay Presidency, Sir George Arthur,
in 1842.

Since Sir George was new to his post and inexperi

enced, his secretary soon found himself in a highly responsible
position.

This was especially helpful, as he became quite

conversant with the administration of the Sind, where he was
later Chief Commissioner.

Prere was an adviser to the Eahaj

of Sattara from 1846 to 1849.

During his tenure there, he

supported such projects as irrigation and the building of
the first tunnel in India.

The annexation of Sattara by the

British in 1849 propelled him into the position of Area
Commissioner.

Prere was Chief Commissioner of the Sind from

1850 until 1859, a position in which he showed considerable
administrative ability; by pacifying what had once been a
rather turbulent province, he turned it into a showcase of
i

British reform.

The Indian Mutiny which broke out in 1857

^Sir Llewellyn Woodward, The Age of Reform. 1815— 187.01
Vol. XIII of The Oxford H i s t o r y of England ed. by Sir George
Clark (15 vols.; 2nd ed.; Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1936-1965),
403, 421-22, 425-26.

hardly affected the Sind,

5

which sent relief to the more

threatened areas in India, especially beleagured Multan.
Frere received the thanks of Parliament and was made a Knight
Commander of the Order of the Bath.

Recognition of his

ability led to nomination as the first civil service member
from outside Bengal to the Governor's Council in 1859.

He

continued in this post until his appointment as Governor of
Bombay in 1862.

It was in Bombay that he faced the first

storm of his career, which until then had been a placid ascent
in the hierarchy of the Government of India.

The economy

there had experienced a sudden burst of prosperity when the
American Civil War brought about a desperate need for cotton
to supply the factories of England.

The Bank of Bombay became

involved and vastly overextended its credit.

Its fall in

1866 led to charges that the Governor of Bombay had not held
enough control over the situation, and Sir Bartle was removed
the following year.
His removal from the Bombay governorship was not a
complete cashiering for Sir Bartle Frere.
appointed to the India Council in England.
redeem a tarnished reputation.

He was subsequently
Frere began to

When he returned in 1872 from

a successful effort to induce the Sultan of Zanzibar to ban
the slave trade, there was a seat awaiting him on the Privy
^Alfred LeRoy Burt, The Evolution of the British
Empire and Commonwealth from the American Revolution (Boston:
i).C. Heath and Company, 1956), 429-30. Hereinafter referred
to as Burt, Evolution.

Council.

Soon thereafter he was selected to accompany the

Prince of Wales on a tour to India.

Upon his return, in May

1876, from a most successful tour, he was awarded a baronetcy
and the rank of Grand Commander of the Order of the Bath.^

In

view of Sir Bartle*s wide experience as an administrator and
the esteem in which he was held, it was natural that he could
not go into isolation upon retirement.

That same year, there

fore, he was appointed Governor of Cape Colony and High
Commissioner for South African native affairs by Lord Carnarvon,
the Colonial Secretary.

What Carnarvon specifically had in

mind in appointing Prere was a confederation of the South
African states on the Canadian model.
Three problems presented themselves immediately upon
Frere*s arrival at the Cape:

a Kaffir war; Boer unrest

resulting from the annexation of the Transvaal by Sir
Theophilus Shepstone; and the Zulu threat to Natal.
dealt with each in turn.

Prere

The possibility of a Kaffir war

led him to go to King William*s Town on the eastern frontier
to talk with the leading protagonist, Kreli.

The latter was

in no mood to talk and Prere returned empty-handed.

A full-

fledged war soon followed when the Kaffirs attacked a tribe
friendly to the British, the Pingos.

Subsequently put down

by Sir Arthur Cunynghame and General Thesiger, it resulted
in a constitutional crisis in the Cape Colony.

Sir Bartle

was unable to work with the Molteno Ministry and called upon
Sir Gordon Sprigg to form a new government.

The Zulu threat soon began to take up most of Prerefs
time.

Ascending the Zulu throne in 1872, Cetewayo found him

self in disagreement with the Transvaal over territory claimed
by the latter.

A commission studying' the case found that the

Zulu claim was the valid one.

When Prere made the award,

however, he attached certain conditions.

These demands were

not met within a thirty-day time limit, and the task of
enforcement was delegated to General Thesiger.

The British

invaded Zululand in January 1879 and were defeated at
Isandhlwana.

It was not the last word from the British,

however, and they avenged their defeat the following July at
Ulundi.
In the Transvaal, meanwhile, dissident Boers were on
the verge of revolt.

They were especially dissatisfied with

the indifferent treatment accorded their deputations to
London in 1877 and 1879.

Prere met the Boers at Pretoria

in April 1879, promising that their complaints would be con
veyed to London with a recommendation that they be rectified.
The British Government of Benjamin Disraeli, however, was
not happy with Frere*s handling of native affairs.

Public

and Parliamentary criticism and the approaching elections
led to censure and loss of his authority as High Commissioner.
He was finally recalled in July 1880 with the change of
government in Britain.
The years from 1880 until his death on 29 May 1884
saw Sir Bartle Frere generally ignored by men of both parties.

He busied himself, however, with speaking engagements before
various educational, religious, and institutional gatherings.
He was also, for a time, President of the Royal Asiatic
Society and was awarded an honorary LL.D from the University
of Edinburgh.

After his death, the Prince of Wales unveiled

a statue of him on the Thames embankment.
The career of Sir Bartle Prere in the British
colonial service spanned a period of forty-six years.
Governor of both Bombay and the Cape Colony, he also served
as High Commissioner for South Africa.

This was enough to

include him in a group of only thirty-seven governors who,
as one writer has observed, nmight be called ’hard-core1
professionals . . . /cfominating7
mid-nineteenth-century
6
colonial service."
Only six, however, have received
adequate biographical treatment, and Prere has not been one
of them.

This study is an attempt partially to remedy this

fact, concentrating on Prere as the colonial administrator.
It examines, largely through source material, his ideas on
colonial matters in order to gain an understanding of the
attitudes, and their roots, prevalent among colonial admin
istrators of the Victorian Period.

It also aims, in the

process, to clarify the role of the colonial administrator
in that particularly Victorian concept "imperialism."
John W. Cell, British Colonial Administration in the
Mid-Nineteenth Century:
The Policy-Making Process- (New Haven
Yale University Press, 1970), 49#

CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN INDIA
Between 1820 and 1853, Great Britain moved towards a
wholehearted endorsement of free trade, and began to remove
impeding barriers.

This policy was espoused in India by a

group of utilitarians, humanists, liberals, and Christian
reformers concerned with India’s progress; they believed
that free trade was the best way to promote the welfare of
India at that time.-

They based their hopes on the infusion

of capital into India, for without the roads, public works,
steam navigation, and planting of crops such as cotton, tea
2
and tobacco, free trade would be stemmed.
Not until the
1850s, however, did capital finally move into India as part
of an Empire-wide

movement.

Investment on public worKi alone

increased from an

aggregate of £250,000 in 1850 to £4,000,000

in 1854, and the Indian Government created a public works
department to handle the surge.

Politically, this period

^C. R. Pay, "The Movement Towards Pree Trade," The
Cambridge History of the British Empire (8 vols.; Cambridge,
England: University Press, 1929-1963), II, 338-414. Herein
after referred to as C. H. B. E .
2
Bearce, Attitudes. 214-16.
J.. Habakkuk, "Pree Trade and Commercial Expansion
1853-1870," C. H. B. E .. II, 751-805, 788-89.

e

has been termed the 11Age of Dalhousie,t! after the GovernorGeneral of India (appointed in 1848) who pushed so hard for
improvements basic to the policy of free trade in I'xdia.^
The dissolution of the East India Company in 1858 did not
impede the further development of public works*.9
Bartle Prere, as a British administrator in India
during this period, expressed the predominant attitude of
free trade.

Upon leaving the Sind in 1859, he stated:

”1 have endeavoured to pursue the same policy in all
matters affecting commerce, regarding Government inter
ference and Government imposts as in themselves serious
evils, and believing it to be the appropriate function
of Government simply to protect all men in the enjoyment
of their rights and possessions as long as they do not
interfere with the rights and possessions of others,
and to remove all obstacles, natural or artificial, to
such enjoyment; it has been my study not to develope
commerce and industry, but tOgleave commerce and industry
free to develope themselves.”
Prere repeated this theme four years later, when Sir Charles
Trevelyan requested his opinion on the disposition of an
expected £1 million surplus in the Indian Government's budget.
Sir Bartle emphatically recommended construction ox roads and
canals to fuel Indian prosperity.

Utility was not the only

reason for his interest in such projects as irrigation.

He

^Bearce, Attitudes. 220-25.
5C. H. B. E .. V, 318.
John Martinaau, Jhe Life and Oorreainonaenoe of Sir
Bartle Prere (2 vols.; London:
John Murray, 1895), I, 289-90.
Hereinafter referred to as Martineau, Prere.

3

was once asked why he espoused its cause so heartily, to
which he replied:

" ’If you had seen m e n ’s bones as I have,

lying unburied by the roadside, and on entering a village had
found it untenanted by a living person, you would understand
why. "'7
A better understanding of the emphasis laid by Prere
on British public works in India is gained by examination of
its most important aspects.

Roads, for instance, had never

been important prior to the arrival of the British, mainly
because the Indian plains were traversable by cart; in any
case, neither military nor civilian transport was attempted
Q
in the rainy season.
Construction of the Grand Trunk Road
from Calcutta to Peshawar, started in 1839, signaled a new
effort to upgrade the Indian road system in order to speed
the country’s development.

9

The description Bartle Prere

gave of roads in the Sind presented a before and after
picture of British road construction.

" ’There was n o t * f” he

wrote, n,a mile of bridged or of metalled road, not a masonry
bridge of any kind--in fact, not five miles of any cleared
^Prere to Sir Charles Trevelyan (28 January 1863),
Ibid. 402, 415.
Q
Great Britain, Sessional Papers (House of Commons),
’’East India CImprovements in Administration),” XLIII, 18571858, 22. Hereinafter referred to as B. S. P .
^Sir Percival Griffiths, The British Impact on India
(n.p.: Archon Books, 1965), 420-21. Hereinafter referred to
as Griffiths, Impact,

10

road.'”X^

The situation soon changed.

Road construction

mileage was 126 in 1851, and increased to 207 in 1852.

In

the frontier districts alone, from 1853 to 1860, 1,872 miles
of road were constructed and 11’furnished with 786 masonry
bridges, 88 of which, across navigable canals, were passable
12
by boats of the largest sizes.'”

Prere described the roads

he observed in the Upper Sind as being

forty feet in width,

and all of those constructed within the last two years
/during his connnissionershijg7 generally run in perfectly
straight lines from village to village.1”

The 159 bridges

constructed for this road network were "'built of burnt brick,
with mud cement and semicircle arches.

The largest . . .

was

a three-arch bridge, the centre arch of twenty-four feet and
13
two side arches of eight feet each.'" ^
While Governor of Bombay, Sir Bartle Prere grappled
with problems resulting from the lack of good roads.

Pever

often accompanied deficiencies in road and harbor facilities,
because food and clothing were in short supply.

T

A

Prere,

however, had a deep interest in roads in the Presidency for
reasons beyond this.

In 1860, the British imported only

^ M i n u t e 23 September 1861. Martineau. Prere. I.
92,
1XIbid. 107.
X^Minute 14 August 1861, Ibid. 109-10.
X^Prere to Lord Falkland (28 April 1853), Ibid, 108.
X^Frere to Sir Charles Wood (22 February 1863),
I bid. 408.

seven per cent of their cotton from India; the American Civil
War increased this figure to two-thirds of the amount used
by British manufacturers* ^

Prere never doubted India’s

ability to supply Britain in cotton, but there were problems
to be met.

” 'If the demand for cotton continues, there can

be no doubt we can supply all you want.

...

We have been

backward in improving our roads and river navigation; but,
16
I trust we have turned over a new leaf in this respect.’n
A description he gave of the North Canara area illustrated
the problem faced:
"It has a magnificent back country, embracing . . .
our best cotton, coffee, and betelnut districts, with
forests of the finest timber, and a rich and very
civilized coast population.
It only wants roads. . . .
^The present ones/ are already covered with traffic
to an extent whi*ch the road-makers could never have
expected.
By not providing roads, the British went one step further in
penalizing themselves:

railroads would remain unprofitable
18
and the sale of British manufactures lag.
Even so, Bartle
Prere felt that the railroads by. themselves did allow the
Bombay merchants to get into the interior and bring out
15C. H. B. E .. II, 774-75.
Frere to Bourchier (6 October 1861), Martineau,
Prere, I, 399. Also 12 August 1862 (Bombay), Balkrishna
Nilaji Pi+alls, ed., The Speeches and Addresses of Sir H. B, E.
Prere (Bombay, 1870), 231-32.
Hereinafter referred to as
Pitale. Speeches.
^ P r e r e to Lord Elgin (20 February 1863), Martineau,
Prere, I, 406.
18Ibid, 407.

12

cotton; the resulting facilitation of commercial travel more
than offset the cost of the railroad.

19

Fx’ere believed, as already noted above, that the
great need in India, besides roads, was canals.

When the

British arrived, they had found the existing canals in sad
shape due to neglect.

An investigation of the canal system

in 1850 led to the decision to put the entire program under
one uniform plan with a public works department in each of
the Presidencies.

The Indian Government had a separate

department of its own.

20

Prere probably had this example in

mind when he created a public works department in the Sind.
Building the canals was a more complicated matter.

21

Two

approaches were tried in the Sind, both often using dry
river beds.

The first method utilized perennial channels,

with dams diverting water to the desired location;

the

second method, inundation, used the flooded Indus to irrigate
the land.

The latter method predated the arrival of the

British, while the former was an exclusively British innovation.
used.

22

While Prere was in the Sind, both methods were

The first was employed to divert water from the
*^12 August 1862 (Bombay), Pitale, Speeches. 234.

20

B. S. P., "East India (1-rprovements in Admin
istration )7n_lLTTl, 1857-1858, 20, 25.
p -i

Martineau, Prere. I, 117.
22

Sir William Hunter, The Indian Empire:
Its Peoples.
History, and Products (3rd ed.; New York:
AMS Press, 1966),
629-30•
Hereinafter referred to as Hunter, Empire.

13

Indus into the Eastern Narra, which was often dry.

Inun

dation was used with the Bigarri Canal which was deepened
and widened.

23
■ Frere described the result of this work in a

letter of 10 June 1851#

It brought both prosperity to the

people of the region and increased revenue to the G-overnment.
Frere also believed that the Indians would be more friendly
towards the G-overnment because the improvements would give
OA
" 1 subsistence to many thousands.1H
Two areas in the Bombay Presidency in critical need
of canals were Guzerat and the Deccan.

During good years

when rainfall was normal, water was taken from wells in
25
Guzerat and tanks in the Deccan for irrigation.
Sir Bartle
Frere described what could happen if there was a dry period:
"Last monsoon the rains failed us in the Deccan and
Candeish, and we had to . . . /provide/ relief by famine
works, etc.
They are provinces in which irrigation pays
well, and where, . . . it must be done by Government.
I inquired how much we had spent on new irrigational
works within the last ten years, and found it was about
£7,000, positively not more than £700 a year in a country
larger than Scotland."2®
The normal procedure in guarding against inadequate rainfall
was the use of dams.

They impounded water in the hill valleys
27
and allowed its distribution by channels.
The most important
^Martineau, Frere, I, 119-20. Also B. S. P .. "East
India (Improvements in Administration),11 XLIII, 1857-1858, 21.
^^Martineau, Frere. I, 117-18.
^ H u n t e r , Empire, 630.
26

Martineau, Frere. I, 414.

2^Hunter, Empire. 630.

measure taken in this area while Frere was in Bombay was the
damming of the Moola River.

This created a lake some twelve

miles long and helped supply Poona and 86,000 acres of
surrounding land with water for drinking and irrigation.

28

One of Bartle Frerefs constant interests while in
the Sind was the port of Karachi and its improvement.
found no docks at all upon his arrival there.

He

The Indus

River steamers had to go to Bombay for repairs, and in a
seven year span three vessels had been lost on the trip,
including the newest and largest, the Falkland.

It was

obvious to Frere that the port of Karachi was needed both as
an all-weather port for ships on the Sind coast and as a
means of shortening the distance between northwestern India
and Europe.

He was incessant in recommending modern facil

ities for the port, continuing his interest while Governor
of Bombay.

29

It was during this time that criticism by the

new engineer superintending the Karachi improvement works
threatened to bring the whole program to a halt.

This raised

Frere*s ire, inciting him to complain that he was " 1ashamed
to write to Englishmen of this nineteenth century on the
general advantages of harbours, or to discuss the money value
of a good harbour as compared with a bad one.,!1^

A Karachi

^^Martineau, Frere, I, 416.
^ M i n u t e 23 September 1861, Ibid. 92-99.
^ F r e r e to Captain Eastwick (22 May 1866), Ibid. 98.

15

Port Trust was finally created in 1880 to expand and modernize
the port’s facilities.

*51

A good index of the effectiveness

of improvements of this type was contained in an account
given by Prere showing that seaborne trade nearly tripled
from the years 1853-54 to 1857-58.

The number of sailing

vessels entering Karachi harbor had risen from one to fiftyseven in the years from 1851 to 1 8 5 7 - 5 8 . ^
Steamers from Britain steadily increased their range
throughout the years from 1825 to 1853» until they reached
Australia the latter year. ^

Prere believed that in addition

to railroads, steamers would help the port of Karachi.

He

roundly ch'astised the decision of the Bombay authorities to
turn down an offer by the Steam Navigation Company in June
1855 for a Bombay-Karachi mail service every two weeks.

It

was, in his opinion, a " ’very serioi^.s discouragement to the
development of the commercial resources of this port /Karachi^111
among other things, he believed it would have facilitated
light freight and reduced the hardship of the overland route
on invalids and others.

Though Frere had lost one battle, he

still fought for his idea by next endorsing, while in Calcutta
in 1862, an attempt by William Mackinnon to obtain a subsidy
from the Indian Government.

The subsidy would allow Mackinnon

to operate steamer service for ports stretching from Calcutta
31C. H. B. E .. T. 263.
Frere to Seymour (17 March 1859), Martineau, Frere.
I, 285,
330. H. B. B . . II, 411-12.

to Karachi.

Opposition by the Bombay Presidency meant, however,

that the plan had to be held in abeyance until 1863 when Prere
became Governor and ended any opposition to it.
Rail construction in India traced its beginnings back
to 1848 and Governor-General Dalhousie.

Prior to the admin

istration of Dalhousie, rail lines had been short and built
for strategic reasons.

It was he who gave the Government the

idea of using private British enterprise to build an Indian
rail system.

Dalhousie1s suggestions were finally adopted

with the decision to build 5,000 miles of rail using joint33
stock companies from Britain.
Bartle Prere reflected both
attitudes.

While personal secretary to Governor George Arthur,

he pressed for a short rail line across Salsette.

His greatest

interest lay, however, in the railroads used in conjunction
with the port of Karachi.

He suggested, in 1853, the building

of the Karachi-to-Kotree rail line to connect the port with
the transfer point for steamers from the Punjab; finally
36
begun in 1858, it was completed in 1861.
Prere, speaking
at the inauguration of the railroad, alluded not only to such
obvious advantages as the time that would be saved and its
profitability to all concerned, but also to the fact that its
very existence was sure to bind India to and solidify the
^ Martineau, Prere, I, 103-04, 297-98.
350. H. B. E .. II, 789.
3 Martineau, Frere. I, 45, 95, 102-03

Empire.

He touched upon an. even more significant develop

ment in a later speech.

The work on the railroads was

helping to foster a new sense of independence in the average
rail worker; in turn, the caste system was being transcended.
What would result, in Prere*s opinion, was worthy of more
37
than passing thought.
British reform activity touched on other matters
besides steamers and railroads.

The Indian postage stamp,

for example, owed a possible debt to Prere, if he himself is
to be believed.

The Sind postage stamp, which Prere intro

duced in 1854, preceded the Indian one by two years.

Use of

the stamp had been encouraged by the refusal of the Indian
Government to provide money for post offices, and Prere noted
that 111the system worked very well, and of course very
cheaply, for we got a complete network of post-offices and
postal lines all over the country without expense*11; it also,
he believed, provided the spark for the all-India stamp.
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India-wide, the increased use of.postage stamps had cut the
postal deficit by two-thirds by 1 8 5 8 . ^
Municipalities were also affected by British reform
activity.

When the British first came to India, they followed

^ 2 9 April 1858 (Karachi), 21 April 1863 (Khandalls),
Pitale, Speeches. 220, 244-45#
^^Martineau, Prere. I, 111-12.
^ B * S. P., "East India (Improvements in Administra
tion)," XIIII, 1857-1858, 11.
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quickly on the heels of the Mughal official who collected
taxes and provided a few basic services to traders in return.
The British followed the tradition by consulting with the
leading traders and other citizens about taxes.

But of all

the Presidencies, Bombay was the most active in India in
implementing Act XXVI of 1850, which allowed municipalities
to be set up.4^
them.

Bartle Prere reflected Bombay*s interest in

He had been President of the Karachi municipality from

1852 to 1859.

The importance of municipalities, in his view,

was that improvement was a permanent, ongoing matter, instead
of an ill-organized spurt of energy every now and then.4^
It was his opinion, that 11'large sums which ought to be raised
and spent on objects more or less local (roads, canals,
education, and many others), should have been provided by
local taxation, locally arranged, by local bodies.1"4^

He

had acquainted India with municipalities while he was in
Sattara, so that money could be raised for his public works
projects.

Bombay was one of the more elaborate devices set

up as a result of his efforts.

It provided for a Municipal

Commissioner and auxiliary officers in health, finance, and
engineering.

Financial supervision of these men was exercised

by the bench of justices and the Governor-General.

One of

the fir3t actions taken by the Commissioner and his health
4QC. H. B. E .. V, 529-30.
4^Pitale, Speeches. 506.
4^Martineau, Prere. I, 303-04.

officer was a.move to cut the death rate in Bombay, ah effort
which proved successful in later years.
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In the end, public works became a double-edged swore.
It provided the foundation for Indian industry.44

Conversely

it often infringed upon Indian sensibilities, thereby laying
the groundwork for the Indian Mutiny.

The Mutiny in turn

destroyed the old East India Company, compelling the British
Government to assume responsibility in 1858.

(The Governor-

General also became known as Viceroy after this date.)

As a

result of the Mutiny, decisions about Indian government were
increasingly made in London, the British grew suspicious of
reform, thus losing their former sense of mission, and racial
4.5
antagonism arose. ^ Frere, however, did not 'follow the trend
the reasons for which were varied and are explained in the
following chapter.

45Ibid, 71, 74, 462-63.
44Strachey, The End of Empire, 58.
4^Burt, Evolution. 427, 380-83, 386, 434-35.

CHAPTER III
INDIAN GOVERNMENT
Two reasons can be given for the opposition of Sir
Bartle Erere to the three basic trends— concentration of
power in London, loss of a sense of mission, and racial
antagonism— which followed the Indian Mutiny.

The first

reason was his admiration for three former administrators
of the old East India Company, Mountstuart Elphinstone,
Sir Thomas Munro and Sir John Malcolm.

Both Elphinstone

and Munro believed that Indian self-government was a certain
eventuality to be prepared for.

Elphinstone envisioned that

it would come about principally through education of the
Indians.

Malcolm was an advocate of Indian participation in

the covenanted civil service, to be gained through vernacular
education with the use of English as an auxiliary to convey
2
Western knowledge.
One writer was essentially correct when
he commented that in the first half of the nineteenth century
the civil servants in India were pro-Indian.

(London:

Sir Henry Bartle Edward Prere, Indian Missions
John Murray, 1874), 12.
^Bearce, Attitudes. 245-47.
^Griffiths, Impact. 163-64.
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The second reason for the obstinacy of Frere must he
attributed to his administrative background.
Non-Regulation a r e a t h a t

The Bind was a

is, one of those areas annexed

since the late eighteenth century.

(5

It has been described

by one writer as being
characterised by simple and more direct methods of
procedure and by the greater accessibility of the
officials to the people; but chiefly by the union of
all powers— executive, magisterial and judicial— in
the hands of the District Officer, here termed Deputy
Commissioner, subject, however to the appellate and
supervisional jurisdiction of the Commissioner of the
Division in all branches of work.
The system was
paternal rather than formally legal though legal
principles were by no means set aside and it largely
depended for its success on the personal character,
initiative, vigour and discretion of the local officers.

r

The system was not arbitrary, for certain principles were
set down on which the District Officer based his conduct,
and there was always supervision by the Commissioner.

It

was essentially a return to the practice of the Mughal Empire
of letting executive decisions be made by the man on the spot
in this case the District Officer described above.

7

With such a background, it is easy to understand the
reaction of Bartle Frere to the manner in which Bengal was
governed.

He blamed the Indian Mutiny of 1857-58 on the fact

^Edward Thompson and G. T. Garratt, Rise and Fulfil
ment of British Rule in India (Allr.habad:
Central Book Depot
1962), 47&-77*
Hereinafter referred to as Thompson and
Garratt, R u l e .
5C. H. B. E .. V, 22.
6Ibid. 87.
Griffiths, Impact. 164-65.
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that the Bengal Army was controlled by paper departments and
underpaid officers who had no real authority.
Frere that it had no commander.

It seemed to

The need, therefore, was for

its centralization through well-paid officers who knew their
men by inspection.

Fewer officers, fewer European troops

and mercenaries would be needed.

Diversity of units, dictated

by conditions, could be tolerated.

This idea was based on

Frere*s premise that it was very important to an Asiatic
soldier to know who was his master, for he had known only
despotic government.

Officers, therefore, should be given

complete authority over the natives, including the right to
dismiss.

The officer would be given blame along with praise

in retrospect, and he would not have to obtain previous
sanction for anything; otherwise the native soldiers would
start to doubt the officer’s authority, and undermine disci
pline .8
The premise Bartle Frere used to rationalize his
approach to the Bengal Army also.underlay his approach to
the Bengal Government.

The problem was that there was no

benign despot, for a benign despotic government was the only
one the natives would respect.

Calcutta officials were not

accessible to those natives in the outlying provinces who
needed help.

The answer to Bengal*s problem was a structured

authority, where responsible officials ruled in matters that
O
Frere to Lord Goderich (15 June 1858); Sir George
Clerk (16 January 1859), Martineau, Frere. I, 265-66, 271-72.

fell below them, but were still responsible to superiors
Q
above.^
Another proposition which Frere looked at with the
jaundiced eye of a Sind administrator was that of centraliz
ation.

This was the movement of administration after the

Mutiny to take on a more unified, technical, and department
alized a p p e a r a n c e . ^

In a dispatch of 15 January 1858 to

Bombay, Frere noted that the only way centralization could
work was by entrusting the government official on the spot
with the responsibility for decisions.

It was in this way

that the British Indian Empire had been made great; centralize
by departments in a far-away place and it "becomes deranged
by the slightest trial or s h o c k . C e n t r a l i z a t i o n violated
the area formerly covered by the District Officer and the
provincial governments.

The technical departments that grew

up were especially mischievous, for it was "difficult for the
District Officer to ease those hardships which must occur
when illiterate villagers are first brought into contact with
12
Western legal and commercial ideas.”
Frere outlined the
concrete result some sixteen years later, in 1874.

Authority

diffused into too many British administrative hands produced
^Frere to Lord Coderich (15 June 1858), Ibid. 266-67.
^ T h o m p s o n and Carratt, R ule. 477-79.
*^Frere to Bombay (15 January 1858), Martineau,
Frere. I, 101.
^ T h o m p s o n and Carratt, R u l e . 478-79.
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the "Village Hampden," who played one administrator off
against the other.

There was the ultimate collapse of an

already ancient and fossilized village structure."
problem department was that of public works.

Another

It was set up

after the Mutiny, and caused endless trouble until Lord Mayo
remedied it in 1870.

There was a constant squabble between

the Government of India and provincial governments over the
allocation of money and control of the work to be done.*^
While Governor of Bombay, Frere once reminded Colonel R.
Strachey that he could not be both Secretary of the public
works department and also superintend all its work.
course would paralyze the whole scheme.

Such a

The Governor proposed,

instead, a minimum amount of paper work and a maximum amount
of construction.

15

After the Indian Mutiny, Britain gave up thoughts of
unifying the whole of India under its direct control.

The

British felt that their former policy had impeded progress in
the independent states by creating uncertainty as to their
future.

The new attitude towards the independent Indian

states still in existence was outlined in the Proclamation
of 1858.

It assured their ruling heads of state of the right

to perpetual rule and succession.
13

While doing this, however,

Frere, Indian Missions. 59-61.

^ T h o m p s o n and Garratt, R u l e . 479.
^ F r e r e to Strachey (12 October 1865)# Martineau,
Frere. I, 423.

the British still exercised an indirect influence by reminding
rulers of their responsibility for the welfare of their people,
and warned against the needless expense of standing armies.

16

Sir Bartle Frere brought this out at several of his durbars
while he was Governor of Bombay.

He warned the assembled

Indian nobility, at Poona in 1865 and 1866, of the consequences
of failure.

Those who had led India in the past had to take

a larger share in administering their country in the future,
or they would be left both powerless and without honor.
British dominion over the Indian princes had enhanced immensely
their ability for doing good by limiting their power to do
wrong.

Most important, perhaps, was the exhortation by Frere

at Belgaum in 1865.

He invited the rulers of the Indian

states to forget about enemies now far away since the arrival,
of the British.

Instead of employing one more policeman than

was necessary for internal peace, the money should be spent
on roads, irrigation, bridges, and hospitals, among other

projects.^
The ideas of Bartle Frere concerning centralization
came into play when he joined Lord Canning, Governor-General
and Viceroy of India, in Calcutta in 1859#

One example was

his attitude towards a proposal to reform Canning’s council.
One must retrace the manner in which the government of India

16

Thompson and Garratt, R u l e . 479.

^ 4 September 1865, 29 November 1866 (Poona);
28 November 1865 (Belgaum) Durbars. Pitale, Speeches. 4-5.
14-15, 8-9*
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was set up after the Mutiny in order to understand the
significance of the proposal.

The British Government of

Lord Derby had shaped the Indian Government Act of 1858 and
guided it through Parliament after the Mutiny had been put
down that same year.

The Act provided for the transfer of

power from the East India Company to the British Government.
The intention of the Government was that British India govern
itself with as little interference from Britain as possible.
There was a Council of India to assist the Secretary of State.
The Council was composed of fifteen members holding life
membership unless a petition was put forward by both houses
of Parliament.

Uine of the fifteen members were to have served

in India for at least ten years, seven of the fifteen were
nominated by the East India Company voting in council, and
eight were appointed by the Crown.

The Secretary of State

had to give reasons for ignoring a majority vote of the
Council concerning most Indian measures; matters concerning
either expenditure or loans had to have the Council*s approval.
It was hoped that neither Secretary nor Council would dominate
the other.'1'8
Sir Bartle Prere believed that the arrangement
described above was threatened by the proposal of Lord Canning
to alter his council.
over that body.

Canning*s aim was to gain real control

He wanted, first of all, to abolish the veto

180. H. B. E . . V, 206-12.

power of the executive council over the Governor-General1s
plans.

Canning also wanted to alter their habit of doing

work on a collective basis.

He proposed, instead, that he

be given the right to appoint secretaries to advise him on
departmental matters; group meetings would be held only if
he and a departmental secretary disagreed on a matter.

Lord

Stanley, Secretary of State for India, was in agreement with
Canning's recommendation, and an India Council committee
recommended that it be expanded to include the governors'
councils throughout India.

When Sir Charles Wood became

Secretary of State for India in June 1859» he had another
India Council committee study the recommendations made by
Canning. r It recommended that secretaries be nominated by the
Governor-General, with the Secretary of State for India
having veto power.

The two recommendations by the committees

were transmitted to India.

The subsequent letter from Sir

Bartle Frere to Sir Charles Wood was the most violently
19
critical opinion of these recommendations. ^
F r e r e fs letter to Wood argued that the veto power of
the Secretary of State would make him responsible for affairs
previously under the jurisdiction of the Governor-General.
Such responsibility would necessitate more knowledge of the
Indian situation.

The knowledge could come only from the

Council of India in England, but it was often out of date.

20

He recommended another course, if India was to be ruled from

19rbid, 226-28.

20Ibid. 228.

London.

The Secretary should turn over responsibility for

the affairs of India to a select number of Council of India
members, and dispense with the remainder.

This would allow

the Secretary time to deal with major problems and answer^
questions in Parliament, while the Council under-secretaries
did the actual work.

Frere had written that nyou can have

but one real Government for India, and that . . . Government
can only safely be in India.”

Frere was perhaps exaggerating

in his letter of 15 May 1860 to Wood, but it provided some
basis for his own vision of an ideal government for India.
His plan kept the Secretary of State of the role described
above, but substituted the Governor-General for the Council
of India members.

The Secretary of State would formulate

the system of government for India.

The Governor-General

would make the actual decisions, with the Secretary of State
defending them in Cabinet and Parliament.

21

Two views shaped Frere*s outlook on the governing
of India.

First, the Governor-General should be praised or

blamed for his actions, but only removed, if necessary, after
he had acted.

Second, F r erefs distrust of the Council of

India was total.

He once wrote to Wood that it had the

potential of carrying Britain back to the days when the
Colonial Office tried to dictate to the colonies across the
seas, and had "very nearly lost them in the attempt."

The

^ F r e r e to Sir Charles Wood (15 May 1860); Frere to
Sir George Clerk (9 May 1860); Minute 2 October 1861,
Martineau, Frere. I, 351, 309, 347.
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comparison between the two——Governor—General and Council of
India— presented an inescapable conclusion.

It was difficult

for members on the Council of India to be up-to-date, since
events moved so fast in India.

The Governor-General, in

contrast, was admirably situated to know what was going on
and advise the Secretary of State wisely.

22

Canning never

carried out his proposals for secretarial reform.

The logic

in Fr e re1s letter led Canning to abandon the idea in favor of
department portfolios for councillors.

This was embodied in

the Council Act of 1861 which Wood had introduced in Parlia
ment.

The Governor—General had, under this Act, five

councillors with different duties to advise him.

These men

were, in turn, helped by bodies of secretaries and undersecretaries.

23

James Wilson's income tax was another problem which
Frere commented on while in Calcutta.

The matter of income

tax had arisen because the Indian debt, including the East
India Company's account, was 198 million in 1860.

The

operating deficit for the year 1859— 60 alone stood at
million.

& 7 i

The British Government was rather apprehensive

about running more deficits.

They sent a financial expert,

James Wilson, from England to work on the problem.

Wilson

eliminated the deficit from the Indian budget by ruthlessly
op
Frere to lord de Grey (9 June 1861); Frere to Sir
Charles Wood (22 October I860), Ibid, 357, 359.
23C. H. B. E.. V, 228-29.

slashing civil and military expenditure on one hand and
adding to government revenue through the use of an income
tax on the o t h e r F r e r e
income tax for two reasons.

supported the imposition of the
First, Wil s o n ’s plans for direct

taxes were not revolutionary in Indian finance, since sub
stantially similar taxes had existed until 1834 in Bengal
and 1836 in Bombay.

They were abolished only because making

them uniform would have been an impossible task.

Second,

Frere favored direct rather than indirect taxation.

The

abolition of indirect taxes in the newly-annexed native
states had been popular with everyone except capitalists;
indirect taxes also hindered legitimate trade and commerce.
F r e r e ’s opinions on taxation were futuristic.

25

The income tax

was lifted in 1865, but reimposed as a permanent tax in 1886.
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Sir Bartle Frere also looked to the future of British
India in the matter of representation on the governors*
councils.

He had noted in a letter of 10 April 1861 to Sir

Charles Wood that the day had come when **’Europeans and the
Europeanized community” 1 should be included on the legis
lative councils.

Anything less, he feared, might lead to

27
**funlooked-for and dangerous explosions.” 1

Both Canning

24Ibia. 314-15.
Frere to Sir Charles Wood (23 April 1860); Minute
17 February 1860, Martineau, F r ere. I, 306-07, 303-04.
26C. H. B. E .. V, 317.
2^Frere to Sir Charles Wood (10 April 1861), Martineau,
Frere. I, 340.

and Wood agreed in large part with Frere on the deficiencies
of the councils.

Wood, as a result, introduced a hill into

Parliament which subsequently became the legislative Councils
Act of 1861.

It provided for the expansion of the Governor-

General's council from six to twelve persons.

Six councillors

were to be non-governmental personnel, with the implication
that some would be Indian.

The expanded council would consider

legislation, but the Governor-General had veto power over what
was passed.

28

The first three Indian members of the council

were aristocrats, however, and it was several years before
the British could use the body as a conduit to involve
business and professional men in the governing of India.

29

The British immigrants flooding India after the
Mutiny showed a disriminatory attitude towards the Indians
that Frere abhorred.

He protested, for instance, against

exemptions included for non-Indians in an 1860 bill forbidding
possession of arms.
of a slave state.

In F r erefs view, the bill was suggestive
There was, too, the possibility of revolt

in the Northwest if the British tried to take arms away from
the people there.

A better way to control arms, if necessary,

was through licensing or district searches of houses by
authority of the Indian Government.

He believed that the

Government did not need to trample on Indian rights in order
28C. H. B. E .. V, 234-36, 234 n.l.
29

Thompson and Garratt, R u l e . 476.

30rbid, 475.
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to ensure European immigration.

The goal could be attained

by good administration of all inhabitants under the same laws.
The attitude of Sir Bartle Frere on the role of
missions largely paralleled his conclusion on gun control.
The question of missions was an old bone of contention.

It

had originated in an argument between the East India Company,
which feared a rebellion among the Indians if religion was
pushed too hard, and those who favored an evangelical program
in India.

The apparent winner was the latter party, and the

charter renewals of 1813 and 1833 provided for sees in
Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, to be supported by territorial
revenue of the Company.

The East India Company was more

successful, however, in erecting a barrier between its
schools and colleges and Christian missionary activity.
Bibles were allowed in libraries of educational institutions,
but teachers were only allowed to answer spontaneous questions
about religion after school hours.

By themselves, church

schools were allowed to qualify for grants-in-aid under an
1854 plan.

32

Frere held the church schools in high esteem.

They taught, in his opinion, a much wider range of subjects
than Government schools, and instruction was better.

Their

graduates were better disciplined and were willing to work
hard and quietly.

33

^ S p e e c h ; Frere to Barrow (6 August 1860), Martineau,
Fr e r e . I, 328-29.
32C. H. B. E .. V, 121-24.
333 July 1862 (Poona), Pitale, Speeches. 172-73.

31

Frere lavished praise upon the mission schools, yet
he was adamant in barring religious activity of any kind
from Government schools.

Two dispatches from Sir Charles

Wood, dated 17 June and 1 September 1864, to Frere in Bombay
outlined a complaint by the Church Missionary Society about
the lack of religious teaching in Bombay schools.

The second

dispatch suggested after-hours religious classes taught by
34
schoolmasters as a s o l u t i o n . ^

The reply Frere sent was in

the best tradition of the old East India Company and
Mountstuart Elphinstone, both firm opposers of mixing education and religion for fear of exciting the Indians.

35

Frere

stated that the missionaries on the spot were doing a better
job at conversion than many of their friends believed.

Their

success resulted, in large part, from the absence of bitter
ness among Indians because of the nfreally fair and impartial
course pursued by this Government on all questions of religion
and education.f”

Teaching of religion in schools, besides

endangering missionary work in general, would end in the
same bankruptcy for the church in India as had resulted from
that policy in Ireland.
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In all fairness to the missionaries,

^^Martineau, F r ere. I, 470.
^ M i n u t e , March 1824, George W. Forrest, ed.,
Selections from the Minutes and Other Official Writings of
the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone. Governor" of Bombay
(London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1884), 81.
^ F r e r e to Sir Charles Wood (22 July 1864, 27 September
1864), Martineau, Frere, I, 471, 470.
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however, even Frere later admitted that the spread of religion
in the country had heen only minimal.
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The episode of the dispatch of Sir Charles Wood
legitimately leads to the question of exactly what Sir Bartle
Frere thought of missions, their function, and relation to
government.

He outlined much of his thinking on this subject

in a dispatch to lord Stanley in 1858.

He noted his active,

albeit private, support of Christian missions in India, and
indicated his belief that they had helped to bring a big
change for the better.

As mentioned above, however, he did

not want to see their accomplishments wiped out by illadvised abandonment of the English tradition of religious
toleration.

The Government of India should not use its

power to force Christianity on the Indians; such a course
smacked of Inquisition.^8

It should, instead, ensure the

toleration of individual opinion and speech.

That role could

not be performed by the spreading of religious instruction.

39

The function of independent missionaries, on the other hand,
was to perform a task that no government could possibly
attempt without danger; that is, they could teach what the
West valued most.

The missionaries needed to work first

among the European community, starting with the soldiers and
Sir Bartle Frere, "Speech to Working M e n ’s Meeting,”
Authorized Report of the Church Congress (Bath, 1873), 217.
J

^8Frere to Lord Stanley (19 December 1858), Martineau,
F r e r e . I, 259-60.
39

Frere, Indian Missions. 77.

sailors, then the clerks, cooks, and o t h e r s . ^

The mission

aries, by doing such work, would have the European community
as an example before going to the Indians themselves.

It

was an important aim, since every Englishman was a "public
character" because of his potential influence over the
Indians.^1
One of the more touchy aspects of British admin
istration in India was the covenanted^-2 civil service.

This

group held the responsible positions in the Indian Govern
ment, including judicial posts under the East India Company
and the British Government.

It was largely British, and

training for it took place at an English university after
acceptance by examination.

Its counterpart was the uncoven

anted civil service, composed mostly of Indians who held
lower posts in government.

The Charter Act of 1833 and the

Que e n ’s Proclamation of 1858 had confirmed the right of
native-born Indians to enter the covenanted civil service.
Pew Indians took the opportunity, however, because it was a
certain road to social ostracism.

The years from 1858 until

1886 produced no real change in the staffing of the Indian
A C\

Undated note on prepared Pree Kirk General Assembly
speech; Prere to Lord Goderich (5 January 1859), Martineau,
Prere, I, 471-72, 262.
^ 2 9 August 1863 (Poona), Pitale, Speeches. 251-52.
^2The word
of employment were
practice continued
Company in India.
of this group.

"covenanted" was used because agreements
signed with-the East India Company; the
after Britain assumed the duties of the
C a H. B. E .. V, 357.
Prere was a member

civil service.

It amply upheld the tradition, as described

in the House of Commons in 1853, of being a " ’native agency
and European superintendence.” 1

While Lord Lawrence was

Yiceroy, however, the scarcity of Indian candidates for
competitive examinations to enter the covenanted civil service
caused some concern.

It was therefore proposed in 1868 that

scholarships be provided, partially on the basis of nomination
and partially be competition, to send Indians to England for
education.

The idea was that once the Indian’s education

was completed, he would enter the civil service or some other
A

*2

professional position.
The proposal of the Indian Government for scholar
ships did not suit the Secretary of State, the Duke of Argyll,
and he turned down the sug g e s t i o n . ^
quick retort from Bartle Prere.

This action brought a

A "Dissent by Sir Bartle

Prere," dated 18 Pebruary 1868, referred to the very limited
opportunities for Indian employment in positions of high
responsibility in the Indian Government.

He lashed out at

the "rather pompous parade • • •.of a few crumbs of patron
age."

The way to get Indians into responsible government

jobs, such as positions on the bench, was to pay them enough
that lawyers could leave the bar.

The objective was to

Anglicize public servants so that they would identify them-

43rbld, 357, 359-62.
44Ibid. 360.
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selves with the Indian Government in the belief that it was
the best possible one.

15

Entrance into the higher civil service ultimately
depended on adequate Indian education, as Mountstuart
Elphinstone had foreseen.
tion program.

Elphinstone had a two-tier educa

He favored Western learning for those Indians

considering high public office. He also backed improved and
4.6
expanded vernacular schools.
Generally, however, Elphinstone
saw Indian education as being primarily concerned with the
upper castes; otherwise there would be a danger of revolt by
a dissatisfied educated lower caste.

The other objective for

which Elphinstone strived was education of Indians built on
their own tradition .

^

Bartle Prere, like Elphinstone,

deprecated any effort to educate the Indians on a massive
scale because of lack of plans or money.

He favored a return

to the old Directive of 1854 with its grants-in-aid for educa
tion, the planning being done according to the needs of each
province.

A few general rules and guidelines as to how the

money was to be spent were all that was needed.
^ B. S. P .. ”East India (Employment of Natives),” L,
1867-1868, 293-94.
46C. H. B. E .. V, 107-08.
17
^'Bruce T. McCully, English Education and the Origin
of Indian Nationalism (New York:
Columbia University Press,
1940;, 29.
^ F r e r e to lord Goderich (5 January 1859), Martineau,
Prere, I, 261.
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Like Elphinstone, Sir Bartle Prere favored the upper
classes in his framework of education.

Others who would

possibly benefit from education were the Bheels, coolies and
some other races; some were not badly in need of it but could
use it to their own advantage.

4.9

Prere stressed the Charter

clause of 1833, ending discrimination against Indians in
higher employment, and its importance to the upper classes.

50

Only by supplying men of similar caliber to those of English
universities, he warned, could Indians hope to take positions
in public administration.

This requirement was doubly impor

tant, however, for the Sirdar youth; without education,
"wealth and power" would be taken from their hands in the
future.51
Regarding the university graduate, Prere envisioned
a special need for him to communicate, in vernacular litera
ture, the European learning he had acquired.

Even more

important was his role as teacher of the people, the "most
powerful of levers to move the great mass of popular ignor
ance."

He formed the link between men of different race and

religion, keeping them together when they might otherwise
fall apart.

He promoted an understanding and appreciation

49Tbid, 262.
50

C. E. Carrington, The British Overseas;
Exploits
of a Nation of Shopkeepers, ftart" Is Making of the Empire
(2nd ed.; Cambridge, England:
University Press, 1968), 431*
•^6 April 1863 (Bombay); 28 November 1865 (Belgaum)
Durbar, Pitale, Speeches, 120-22, 9-10.

of the purpose of British rule, which was pledged to administer
for the good of the Indian people,

Indian classical litera

ture, such as Zend and Sanskrit, would fulfill the same
function as the Western classical languages.
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The educated

Indian was, in short, a most important link in British rule
of India,
Frere was generally true to what he conceived to he
the hallmark of good government, which one author has termed
55

ffpervading influence,11

The emphasis was on individual

initiative on the part of the administrator; Indians were not
to be forced upon, but taught the fruits of Western progress
by example.

Education was to be the link between the British

and Indians to achieve this goal.

^228 April 1862, 8 April 3 865, 11 April 1864,
8 January 1867, 6 April 1863 (Bombay), Pitale, Speeches. 110,
141, 133, 155, 120.
^ A r c h i b a l d Paton Thornton, The Imperial Idea and
Its Enemies:
A Study in British Power (London:
Macmillan;
New York:
St. M a r t i n 1s Press, 196f>), 79# Hereinafter
referred to as Thornton, Idea.

CHAPTER IV
DEFENSE OF INDIA
An understanding of the views of Sir Bartle Frere on
the defense of India, basically a problem of the frontier
tribes and Afghanistan, is essential for two reasons.

First,

it serves as a good barometer of the imperialist impulse in
British foreign policy.

The new imperialist outlook took

root in the dispute over the defense of India, because it
was the most pressing concern of the Empire at that time.
Second, Frere*s views on Indian defense provide a basis for
his later actions in South Africa.
The matter of the frontier tribes arose when the
British occupied the Sind in 1843 and the Punjab in 1849.
They found themselves confronting the Baluches and Pathans,
tribes which regularly raided the Sind and Punjab; this in
turn meant they had to deal with the local overlords, the
Khan of Kalat and the Amir of Afghanistan.

Two schools of

thought, the Sind and Punjab schools, developed as to how
frontier defense should be conducted in view of the problems
with the tribes.
aspects.

The schools differed in two important

First, the Sind theory of administration emphasized

repression; in contrast, the Punjab school depended more on
political control of the frontier tribes.
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Second, the Sind
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system was rather unorthodox in depending, after 1848, on
Major Jacob and his completely mobile t r o o p s T h e

essential

character of Jacob's system was described by Bartle Frere.
It meant, he wrote, that authority— civil and military,
regular and native troops, engineers, police— was concentrated,
2
and not fragmented as in the Punjab*
He was impressed with
the results of the system*
there had been none before*

Jacob had introduced order where
There was no fear of raiders and

people were able to travel in perfect safety along the fron
tier*

Jacobabad, under Jacob's direction, had been turned

from an area of desert into a garden of plenty, with crops
and canals crisscrossing the area*
noted from the above description:

*5

Two points should be

the stress laid by Prere

on the unitary nature of Jacob's system, and the resulting
advances in civilized behavior.
be emphasized enough.

The effect on Prere cannot

The success of the system was a major

determinant in his thoughts on frontier defense, whether
Indian or South African, for the rest of his life.
Prere continually emphasized the authoritarianism
and civilized nature of the Sind system.

Pirst, it was

basically a military system depending to a large extent on
the cooperation of the frontier tribes and the Khan of Kalat
1C. H. B. E .. V, 448-50.
p

Prere for Lord Northbrook (1876 Memorandum),
Martineau, Prere, I, 165#
^Prere to Lord Falkland (March 1855), Ibid. 148-49.
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in securing the border.
a civilized system.

Second, and more important, it was

At its center was the Khan of Kalat.

Uninfluenced inside his own territory, he was tinder British
military direction concerning external relations.
was treated as an independent ally.
bolster him in every way possibles

The Khan

A cardinal rule was to
complaints below the

level of chief, for instance, were referred to the chiefs;
complaints by or against the chiefs were referred to the
Khan.

The Khan was encouraged to keep an orderly government

and satisfy any of these complaints.^

Tribesmen along the

Sind frontier were safe from British retaliation if their
activities did not threaten the people on the British side
of the border, or the Khan of Kalat.

The use of troops was

generally restricted to those cases which police were unable
to handle.

Armed theft of cattle, for example, was included

in this category.

Forays across the Sind frontier in search

of marauders were purely a military matter.

Troops considered

15

everyone armed^ on the British side of the border as their
enemy; on the other side, an enemy of the Khan of Kalat.
^ E x t r a c t s Illustrative of the Sind Frontier System,11 in
Sir Bartle Frere, Afghanistan and South Africa:
Letters to
the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P. Regarding Portions of
iHis MidlothianSpeeches, and a Letter to the hate Sir John
Kaye, and Other Papers (5 th ed.j London;
John Murray, 1881),
Y6, 73. Hereinafter referred to as Frere, Afghanistan.
Sir Bartle did not doubt where the real loyalties of
the chiefs lay, and he wrote about how they would revert to
their own authority if British power or resolve ever weakened.
Frere to Major Green (16 October 1858), Martineau, Frere . I,
244-45.
30.

H. B. E .. V, 449.

Attention was directed only at those who resisted and whole
sale destruction was not permitted.

Prisoners taken by troops

on the Khan's side of the border were turned over to him.

6

Prere, in a letter to lord Elphinstone, described a strike
on a frontier tribe (the Murrees) by Major H. G-reen, British
Resident to the Khan of Kalat.

He noted that it had been

done without "'massacre, plunder, or destruction, or barbarity,
7

or severity.'"
Prere took a dim view, on the other hand, of the
Punjab frontier system.

The Sind system made every effort

to bolster the authority of the Khan of Kalat.

Punjab author

ities, in contrast, bypassed the Amir of Afghanistan, overlord
of the frontier tribes in that area.

They tried, instead,

to deal separately with each tribe, and to use them as a
buffer between the Amir and the Punjab.

Prere also criticized

the retaliatory raids made along the Punjab border for
marauders.

Authorities failed to note, in doing so, that the

tribes were usually divided into two classes:
plundered and those who cultivated.

those who

Punjab authorities, by

destroying the crops and goods of the latter, united the whole
tribe against them.

Writing of the retaliatory raids of 1860

along the Punjab border against the Wuzzeerees, Prere indica
ted that a much more telling blow could have been dealt if a
•"Extracts Illustrative of the Sind Frontier System,11
in Prere. Afghanistan. 73-74.
7
Prere to Lord Elphinstone, M a r t m e a u , Prere. I,

248-50 .
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list of the men to he surrendered had been handed to the
chiefs.

A large share of subsequent property and crop destruc

tion, as a result, would have fallen on the m e n fs heads,
encouraging them to think more seriously before going on plun
dering forays again.®
Paralleling the problem of the frontier tribes was the
question of Afghanistan.

The problem dated from the 1830s,

but the years from 1850 until the early part of the twentieth
century saw it become even more complicated with the advent
of the telegraph and cable.

European governments were able

both to control and be influenced by events in that sphere
through these devices.

Afghanistan and all of Central Asia

then became the main preoccupation of Indian external policy.
Afghanistan played an especially important part in this drama
because the British were advancing on it from the south, and
the Russians from the north.

Indian administrators were

generally of either of two opinions about the conduct of
relations between Great Britain,.the tribes of the Northwest
Frontier, and Afghanistan.

First, a succession of Viceroys

from Canning on regarded interference as too dangerous,
especially after the events of 1838-42 described below.
Second, the "forward" school felt that the course of events
®Minute 22 May 1860; Frere for Lord Northbrook (1876
Memorandum); Frere to Lord Canning (15 November i860), Ibid,
362— 64, 165— 66, 366— 68.
9C. H. B. B.. V, 403.

q
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made interference inevitable.

Such interference would take

the form of 11alliances, missions, and, where necessary,
subsidies in the form of money and material of war.”10

John

Lawrence was representative of the first view and, as we shall
see, Bartle Frere of the latter.
No adequate comprehension of the problem of Afghan
istan can be gained without tracing the history of active
British involvement which began there in 1838.
ruler Taimur had died in 1793#

The Afghan

A struggle ensued for the

throne, and was settled in 1826 with the accession of Dost
Muhammed.

Twenty-three royal claimants, including the major

one, Shah Shuja, had been excluded by his accession.

Shah

ShuJa had royal descent on his side; Dost Muhammed strength
and ability.

At this point Afghan politics became entangled

with what was happening in Persia, where Russia's influence
increased steadily after 1828.

The British began to worry

about the situation.

A Persian attack on Herat menaced

Eastern Afghanistan.

Dost Muhammed was also threatening the

holdings of Ranjit Singh centered in Peshawar because of his
cooperation with Shah Shuja for the recovery of the Afghan
throne.

Finally, there was the collaboration of Dost Muhammed

with the Russians, already dominant in Persia.

All these

factors resulted in a "'Tripartite Treaty'” between Shah Shuja,
10A. W. Ward and G-. P. Gooch, eds., The Cambridge
History of British Foreign Policy, III (New York:
Macmillan
Company; Cambridge, England:
University Press, 1923), 72-73•
Hereinafter referred to as C. H. B. F. P.
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Ranjit Singh, and the British.

The essential element in the

treaty was the British promise to help Shah Shuja recover the
Afghan throne.

It was hoped that in this way Britain would

secure a friendly Afghanistan.
disaster.

The result was an unmitigated

Active British involvement lasted from November

1838 to December 1842.

During that time, the British military

force which had placed Shah Shuja on the Afghan throne found
itself isolated in Kabul by angry Afghans.
they were cut down almost to a man.

Trying to flee,

Once Kabul had been

retaken, the British were forced to reinstate Dost Muhammed
on the throne in order to extricate themselves from an imposs
ible situation."^
Stung by the events of 1838-1842, Indian policy for
another thirty years was one of non-interference in Afghan
affairs.

12

All

who, along with

this was quite distasteful to Sir Bartle
Sir Henry Rawlinson, was worried about

Russian threat to India.

13

Frere

the

The Disraeli Ministry, which

replaced that of Gladstone in 1874> gave Frere his opening.
One of the aims of the new Government was to initiate a more
active foreign policy, especially in Central Asia, where it
wanted to eradicate the dominant position held by Russia.
Lord Salisbury was made Secretary of State for India.
l:LC. H.

B. E .. V, 484-96, 499-521 .

12C. H.

B. f. P .. Ill, 72.

A dis-

R. W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli. Gladstone and the
Eastern Question:
A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics
(Londons
Macmillan and Co., 1935), 220.
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patch of 22 January 1875 from Salisbury to the Indian Viceroy
marked the genesis of the new British Afghan policy.

It

instructed the Viceroy to put into effect a program based on
Sir Henry Rawlinson's minute of 1868.

This minute had pro

posed that a resident b e .stationed in Afghanistan; going
first to Herat, then Kabul, he was to supplement the regular
native agent.

The dispatch had been sent upon the instigation

of Frere, then a member of the India C o u n c i l . ^

These actions

underlined a point later made by Frere (in 1880) from which
he never deviated:

British isolation from Afghan affairs

was self-defeating, for it only drove Afghanistan into the
15
arms of another power.
In an article written in 1875 as a public exposition
of the actions taken by Salisbury, Sir Bartle Frere gave the
most comprehensive outline of his views on the Afghan problem
(past and present) and Central Asia in general.

Looking back

on previous British policy, he ridiculed British actions
against Dost Muhammed, the one man who could have assured
Britain of a strong and independent, but friendly Afghan
state.

Backing him would have been in Britain’s real interest,
16
and not maneuvers to remove him.
British officials acted
more like "Chinese mandarins” than anything else from that
14~C. H. B. g. P .. Ill, 77-78.
15
^ ’’Memorandum enclosed in Cape of Good Hope Despatch,
No. 9,” in Frere, Afghanistan. 11.
16C. H. B. B.. IV, 493.

time on by their complete disregard of what was happening
across the Indian border.

The IMpolicy of masterly inactiv

ity,*” Frere declared, had been nothing more than denying the
existence of a Russian menace in Central Asia.

But now, in

the 1870s, even the supporters pf the policy were abandoning
the ship.

Public writers were demanding that the British

Government do something about the Russian threat.

Moves

mentioned included sending an army to the Northwest Frontier
and a fleet to the Baltic.

17

Frere was not as easily intimidated by the Russians
as were others, for he saw Russian weaknesses in any power
play involving India, Afghanistan, and Britain.

Russia by

itself had neither the money, men, nor necessary organization
to go to war with Britain.

The British navy could harass

the Russians at will from the Baltic Sea to the Indus, and
Britain possessed men capable of defeating any invading force
by cutting its lines of communication.

The problem facing

the Russians, therefore, was that a direct attack on India
required an aggregate of powers to overcome the first-rate
navy possessed by Britain.

Russia would be risking a general

war in Europe, destroying the work of ages in the process, and
leaving it, in the end, a second-rate European power.

Russia

also had to consider the potentially explosive situation at
home.

Revolutionary changes were taking place in the country’s

*^Sir H. B. E. Frere, ’’England and Russia-in the
East,” The Quarterly Review. CXXXVII (April 1875), 571-74#
Hereinafter referred to as Frere, "East.”

social fabric.

Any attempt at conquest would drain away

energy needed for problems arising between peasant, aristoc18
racy, and educated classes.
Russia, even so, had to be viewed as an aggressive
power in its own right.

Just as Britain had built its own

Indian Empire, Russia was benefiting from the introduction
of a more effective government in the decayed states it over
ran.

People were glad to rid themselves of oppressors.

Russian aggression was perhaps even more real than previous
British expansion because of strong public support in Russia;
on the other hand, the British had been compelled to contend
with the majority of the home population opposed to expansion
in India.

Such public support in Russia was largely explain

able because expansion was linked to religion, a strong
political force "inseparably” bound up with the throne.
Then, too, the throne’s decision to stamp out slavery among
the Central Asian Turkomans gave the whole enterprise the
aura of a holy crusade.

Frere asserted that such strong sup

port for Russian aggression required that it be stopped by an
equally civilized power.

It had to "give her honest hearing

and reasonable redress in all frontier discussions, and . . .
require equal justice from her."

19

Although the chances of outright aggression by Russia
on India were so slight, Frere feared subterfuge.

18rbld, 591, 593.
19Ibid. 581, 583-86, 588.

He had
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outlined what could happen in his letter to Sir John Kaye in
1874.

First, large-scale Russian influence on the Afghans

could undermine Indian confidence in British rule.

Second,

in the case of British preoccupation with problems elsewhere,
the threat of a Russo-Afghan invasion could tie down vast
numbers of British troops in India.

Third, and most probable,

Russian and Afghan irregulars had the capacity to start fron20
tier trouble costing the British a great deal to contain.
Of these three, the first possibility was the most unlikely.
John Lawrence had pointed out in his Memorandum later in the
year that most natives did not follow Russian progress in
Central Asia.

Those Indians who were interested had probably

not given careful consideration to the problem or what an
occupation of Afghanistan would entail.

21

The logical question at this point was what should be
done to prevent undue Russian influence in Afghanistan.
Three points conveyed in the article by Frere on "Russia and
England in the E ast” should be borne in mind in evaluating
his ideas concerning this problem.

First, Frere believed

that the Russians had a naturally active policy.

Past British

policy had been not only defensive but also negative. No
friends were to be won in this way among the Orientals;
instead, the Russians advanced that much closer.

A true

20Frere to Sir John Kaye (12 June 1874), in Frere,
Afghanistan. 56-38.
21

"Memorandum by the Right Hon. Lord Lawrence on the
Central Asian Question," Ibid. 48.
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defensive policy, in contrast, required carefully-considered
action on several fronts.

Second, F r e r e ’s biggest concern

was to construct a policy putting British relations with its
nneighbours north and west of India on a more permanently
satisfactory footing.11

Third, he did not contemplate Britain

trying to halt the Russian advance until it reached the
Afghan border.

22

The last point was part of his concept,

mentioned in a note to Lawrence’s Central Asian Memorandum
(1875 )9 of considering all areas
bulwarks to its security.

which adjoined India as

They were not to be open to any

type of political influence impairing the security of India.
t

Besides Afghanistan, Nepal, Tibet, Baluchistan, and Kashmir
fell into such a category.

The British and Russians, in

other words, would not meet on the Indian border.

25

No natural buffer was obtainable, however, in
Afghanistan.

Britain had missed its one chance to have such

a buffer while Dost Muhammed was alive.

Now, as Frere out

lined in his letter of 1874 to Sir John Kaye, it had to be
done with definite intent on Britain’s part, and possibly by
force.

One of the first suggestions Frere made was that

military officers acting as agents for the British Government
be stationed at Kabul, Herat, and Kandahar.

They were to be

well chosen and have a good knowledge of the country and
22Frere, "East," 598, 578-81.
"Sir Bartle Frere*s Note on lord Lawrence's Memorandum on the Central Asian Question, Dated 4th November,
1874,” iu Frere, Afghanistan. 71, 68.
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language.

Non-interference in Afghan internal affairs was

to be the rule; the main task of the agents was to support
the ruler in every way possible.

Second, the Amir of Afghan

istan had to understand that conducting relations in a manner
contrary to British interests would result in him being
treated as an enemy.

The British Government would then take

appropriate action.2^"
Britain was ever a trading nation, and Bartle Frere
reflected its concern about any foreign intrusion into its
markets in his article on "Russia and England in the East."
Two groups of expansionists were represented in Moscow.

The

first was made up of the Czar and a small clique of high
officials who opposed active expansion into Central Asia.
Their reasoning was that Russia did not possess a large
enough budget to administer such an empire.

Those in favor

of a truly active expansionist policy included ultra
nationalist politicians, military men (who did not have to
worry about the cost of administration), Russianized Germans,
and merchants.

Public support went to the latter group.

The

presence of the merchants constituted the strongest impulse
driving the Russian advance.

There was a deep-seated dislike

among Russian merchants of their exclusion from the Asian
markets by British competitors.

They were strongly protect

ionist in character, and wanted a conquered Asian territory
2^Frere to Sir John Kaye (12 June 1874), Ibid. 31,

34-35.

which they could monopolize for trade.
certain to Frere:

One thing seemed

India’s Northwest Frontier was certain to

go on a war footing if Afghanistan either let Russian agents
m

or allowed merchants and travelers to move around freely.

25

He had already outlined a move to prevent such a situation
in his letter of 1874 to Sir John Kaye:

the British envoy

to the Amir was to negotiate a commercial treaty.
give Britain parity at least with other countries.

It was to
If it was

not done Britain might he barred from Afghanistan because the
Russians distrusted its commercial power.
The letter of 1874 from Frere to Sir John Kaye also
discussed important measures to be taken for the defense of
the Indian frontier.

An essential move was the occupation

of Quetta, as permitted under previous agreements with the
27
Khan of Kalat.
A railroad was needed to Peshawar from
Karachi, via Multan and Lahore, with a spur to the Bolan Pass,
and an extension by artillery road to Quetta.

The occupation

of Quetta served a two-fold purpose.

First, it was a useful

watch post for southern Afghanistan.

Second, it had the

25Erere, "East," 583, 538, 587, 597.
26
flSir Bartle F r e r e !s Note on Lord Lawrence’s Memo
randum on the Central Asian Question, Bated 4th November,
1874," in Frere, Afghanistan. 63#
Frere favored stimulation of commerce on the Indus
and in Karachi in order to keep tribes attached to the British.
Frere to Lord Canning (1 December 1860), Martineau, Frere, I,
240-41.
27
His great fear about Quetta, he said, was that a
French or Russian adventurer might one day capture it.
Frere
to Lord Elphinstone (25 March 1858), Martineau, F r e r e , I, 237*

potential of becoming a rallying point for the defense of
India beyond the Indus if an invasion came in that sector.
It would also be a force on the flank of any advancing enemy
in such case as the invasion came through the Kyber Pass and
OQ
Kabul.
This whole concept was, however, attacked by John
Lawrence.
two counts:

The occupation, he noted, was open to question on
diplomatically, the Afghans might conclude that

Britain was contemplating an invasion; second, the military
cost of an occupation, a reserve in the Sind as. a backup
force, and fortification of the Bolan rail line would not
make it worth the effort.

British interests in India vis-a-

vis Russia were best represented by British insistence to
the Russians that India was to be defended at all costs.

The

suggestions made by Frere were, in the opinion of Lawrence,
ineffectual for stopping any real Ri^.ssian move towards India.
They would probably lead to a situation such as had existed
in 1838, ruining Indian finances in the process.

29

The best

policy, Lawrence concluded, was to make India as prosperous
and contented as possible.
assured at the same time
ence was threatened.

The frontier tribes were to be

that neither territory nor independ

If the Russians

appeared, they would be

faced by a wall of allied tribes to impede their advance.
OQ

Frere to Sir John Kaye (12 June 1874), in Frere,
Afghanistan. 34, 36.
29
•^Memorandum by the Right Hon. Lord Lawrence on the
Central Asian Question.” Ibid. 52-53, 48-49.
30

r
Bosworth R. Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence (2 vols.;
New York:
Charles Scribner*s Sons, 1885), II, 379.
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A dispatch from Bartle Frere to Lord Salisbury in
March 1876 provided an outline of what Frere believed should
be done respecting Afghanistan and the Indian border.

It

showed that he had perhaps moderated some of his proposals.
He did not think that Calcutta was cognizant of what was
happening on the border.

Frere again expressed his opinion

that R u s s i a ’s aggressive moves could only be met by a frontier
based on a central premise.

That premise was that Afghanistan

serve as a buffer between Russia and Britain in Central Asia;
its accomplishment was through British friendship with the
Amir.

The A m i r ’s territory was safe as long as he remained

friendly with the British; if not, aggression would follow
f,by our instinct of self-preservation.11

The Amir might also

be threatened by other alliances with powers such as Persia
or Kalat,

Frere also suggested that the envoy to the A m i r ’s

court might be able to reside in the Punjab, as long as he
had assistants in Afghanistan itself.

31

This was a change

in attitude, perhaps to make the proposals more palatable to
the Amir, or to obtain support of the Punjab administrators.
Before any concrete action was taken on Afghanistan,
three events followed in rapid succession during 1875 and
1876 that strengthened British power in India and detracted
somewhat from Russian moves towards the Indian border.

On

8 July 1875, Disraeli had announced to the House of Commons
^ F r e r e to Lord Salisbury (3 March 1876), Martineau,
F r e r e . II, 145-49*
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that the Prince of Wales was making a trip to India with the
aim of binding it closer to Britain.
Sir Bartle Prere was
32
appointed guide for the party.
He was, as usual, concerned
about impressions, and recommended that £100,000 be allocated
for presents to the Indian princes instead of the £60,000
already appropriated.

He wrote that presents from Indian

princes worth thousands of pounds required the return of more
than a ”trumpery" little gift.

His mind was eased when the

Indian Government agreed to provide the necessary m o n e y . ^
Prere had tried to persuade Gladstone to buy all the
34.
Suez Canal shares in 1873, only to be rebuffed.
While in
Egypt on the way to India in October 1875, the Prince of
Wales presented the son of the Khedive with the Star of India.
It was only in November, when Disraeli bought the Khedive's
6/17 share of the Suez Canal for Britain, that the signif 5 cance
33

of the act by the Prince of Wales became apparent.

. The

British, as a result, developed a strong interest in Egypt
36
that eventually led to a complete takeover.
Prere had
written that, with the opening of the Suez Canal, India had
32The Annual Register. 1875 (Part I), 58, 114.
^Marti n e a u , Prere. II, 127-29.
54Ibid, 150.
^ The Annual Register. 1875 (Part I), 112-13.
^ R . C. K. Ensor. England. 1870-1914. Vol. XIV of The
Oxford History of England, ed. by Sir George Clark (15 vols.;
Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1936-1965), 37-38.
Hereinafter
referred to as Ensor, England.

become a Mediterranean power.
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The purchase of the Suez

Canal shares made its position secure.
The third move to strengthen British power in India
during 1875-1876 was the use of the title "Empress (or
Emperor) of India11 for the reigning British monarch.

Prere

had recommended in 1857 that such a step be taken in order
" T O

to restore British prestige after the Mutiny;
also lobbied for it in Britain.

Disraeli had

The issue lay dormant

until 1876, when Queen Victoria insisted she be invested with
the title; in view of the intensity of her demand, Disraeli
acceded.^

The measure was opposed by the Liberals, but it

passed through the House of C o m m o n s . ^

It had long been

dreamed of by those concerned with British power in India
after the Mutiny, including Prere; the Russian advance towards
the Indian frontiers provided a good reason for the new title,
since their ruler was styled f,Emperor.ff

It was intended to

have the same reassuring effect on the Indians as the visit
of the Prince of W a l e s . ^

Prere, in his report to the Queen

^M a r t i n e a u , Prere. II, 133.

38rbid, I, 226-27.
59
/ William Plavelle Monypenny and G-eorge Earle Buckle,
The Life of Benjamin'Disraeli. Earl'of Beaconsfield (6 vols.;
London:
John Murray, 1910— 1920}, V, 446-57.
Hereinafter
referred to as Monypenny and Buckle, Beaconsfield.
^ R o b e r t Blake, Disraeli (London:

1966), 562.

Eyre & Spottiswoode,

^Ensor,

England. 39.

^Blake,

Disraeli. 562-63, 563 n. 1.

on the visit of the Prince, wrote how it had established a
new rapport between the monarchy and the Indian people; her
assumption of the new title had transformed her from sover43
eign of India's conquerors to its Empress. ^
About the same time, the situation in Afghanistan
became more heated.

By March 1876, Lord Lytton, the new Vice-

„

roy for India chosen to implement a new forward policy,

A A

was

writing that the British Government had not been forceful
enough about Central Asia.

There should be a clear statement

that the British had paramount interest in Afghanistan, Kalat,
and Baluchistan, and that Russian influence in those areas
could not be tolerated.

Also, the occupation of Quetta should

be considered a British right.

4-5

Negotiations with Kalat in

1876 allowed such an occupation in 1877.

Finally, in November

1878, the British invaded Afghanistan and forced the Afghans
to grant everything they asked.

The most important concess

ions were the establishment of a British mission at Kabul at
the expense of a Russian one, and control of Afghan foreign
policy. „ The Russians acquiesced to the new British action,
not wanting to break up the terms of the Congress of Berlin
so soon, and also due to general exhaustion after a war with
Turkey.

Britain had picked exactly the right moment to move

4^Philip Magnus, King Edward The Seventh (London:
John Murray, 1964), 142.
44C. H. B. P. P .. Ill, 81.
4^Lord Lytton to Prere (26 March 1876), Martineau,
P r e r e . II, 155.
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on the Afghans*

Success in the early part of the Afghan War

was tarnished in September 1879, when the British mission in
Kabul was massacred and British gains put in jeopardy.

The

renewal of war without the threat of Russian intervention,
however,, soon righted the matter*
Prere had seen the imperialist view he shared with
i
others gain acceptance*
British policy in Central Asia was
one of definite forward movement*

The Russians, as Prere

had foreseen for reasons of his own, had not retaliated*

By

this time, however, Prere was in South Africa, serving as
High Commissioner and Governor of the Cape Colony.

He was

in the process of fashioning a forward movement of his own.
A better understanding of Prere*s South African policy can
be gained, however, by examining first some of his ideas
about Africa.

46C. H. B. E . . III. 103, 105, 106.

CHAPTER V
EAST AFRICA:

THE TURKISH THREAT

AND THE SLAYE TRADE
Sir Bartle Frere had left India in 1867 under a cloud
of disapproval as a result of the failure of the Bank of
Bombay.

His appointment to the Council of India might have

been, in normal circumstances, a peaceful interlude before
retirement.

It was not to be, however, due to the Turkish

threat in the Persian Gulf and the problem of the slave trade
in East Africa.

They were more related than might first be

imagined, and a little of their history must be examined to
understand why.

In 1869, with tha opening of the Suez Canal,

the Turks began to exert their power in the Arabian Peninsula
for the first time since the seventeenth century.

They sub

dued the North Yemen tribesmen, and with them Yemen, estab
lished a Turkish protege at Najid on the Persian Gulf, and
formed Turkish naval squadrons in the Red Sea and Persian
Gulf.

It was enough to perturb the British, who had come to

regard the Arabian Peninsula as their own preserve.^
One British group watched the progress of Turkish
influence closely, for they worried about its threat to India,
1R. J. Gavin, "The Bartle Frere Mission to Zanzibar,
1873."
The Historical Journal. Y, No. 2 (1962), 127-28.
Hereinafter referred to as Gavin, "Mission."
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with a sizeable Moslem population*

Besides Frere, the group

included Badger, an expert on the Arabs, Kaye at the Indian
Office, and Rawlinson, like Frere, on the India Council.
It was the religious and somewhat nationalistic rhetoric
that the Turks had begun to use that caught their attention.
The possible effect it could have on Moslem elements in India
was demonstrated, they felt, by the episode of the Hadrami
chieftain.

On one occasion when two chieftains were arguing,

the Sherif of Mecca sent one of them a warning about his
subordinate position to the Sultan of Constantinople as both
political and spiritual head of all Moslems.

A complication

lay in the fact that the chieftain’s nominal suzerain, the
Hizam of Hyderabad, was very troublesome to British Indian
officials.

The long-term implications of the incident to

B ritain’s position in India impressed Frere and the others.
Their apprehension was reinforced by three other events:

a

Moslem revival in the East; the important part Moslems had
played in the Indian Mutiny as pointed out in K a y e ’s History;
and, the murder of the Viceroy, Lord Mayo, by a Moslem.

2

At the same time, other British Government officials
were concerning themselves with the problem of keeping Muscat
and Zanzibar in the British camp in view of Turkish moves
into the Arabian Peninsula.

Politicians, on the other hand,

wanted to leave well alone; an impasse had been reached by
1871.

Government officials wanted Britain to pay a subsidy
2Ibid. 128-29, 129 n. 44.
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due Muscat from Zanzibar; in return, Zanzibar would promise
to suppress the slave trade.

The report, issued in January

1870, was designed to keep everyone happy while not abandon
ing the traditional British attitude towards slavery.

The

officials had affirmed the old British policy towards the
Middle East from 1820 to 1860.

Fashioned by the Governor of

Bombay, Mountstuart Elphinstone, this policy had depended on
informal ties with progressive commercial elements in the
area (chiefly Zanzibar and Muscat).

Essentially, it aimed at

free trade, eliminating the slave trade, and keeping out
other European powers.

•5

The center of the East African slave trade was
Zanzibar.

Operations emanated from there, and the Sultan of

Zanzibar was suzerain along the East African coast north of
Cape Delgado.

Previous efforts to end the trade, including

the use of a British squadron to help the weak navy of the
Sultan, had been unsuccessful.

Just how flourishing this

trade was had been outlined to an unsuspecting British public
when David Livingstone was at home between 1856 and 1858.^
When Britain asked the new Sultan, Barghash, to begin practicable elimination of slavery in 1870, he refused.

5

This

^T.bid. 129-36.
*C. H. B. E .. Ill, 68.
_

. . .

R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa.
1856-90:
The Slave Trade and the Scramble (London:
Paber
and Eaber, n.d.), 165.
Hereinafter referred-to as Coupland,
Exploitation.
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coincided with the complete impasse in 1871 between Govern
ment officials and politicians about British policy in the
area.

Agitation began in June in the House of Commons for a

complete suppression of the slave trade.

The Government

decided to appoint a select committee in order to quieten the
agitation.

It recommended, in turn, elimination of the

slave trade without compensation, for it believed that abolition could only help Zanzibar’s trade.

7

At this point Sir Bartle Prere came into the picture.
He had talked with Livingstone while the latter was in
Bombay in 1863 and had expressed a strong interest in the
Q
abolition of the slave trade.
A strong bond of friendship
had been established between the two men since then* meeting.

q

The refusal of the Government to act on either the inter
departmental report presented in 1870 or the recommendations
of the select committee in 1871, led Sir Bartle to take action.
Agitation, chiefly inspired by him during 1872, brought the
Government around, and that same year he was appointed to
renegotiate a new treaty with Zanzibar forbidding the slave
trade.^

Instructions from the Earl of Granville at the

Foreign Office duplicated the recommendations of the inter^Gavin, "Mission.,?
7

136.

Coupland, Exploitation, 170.

8Ibid, 116.
^The Times (London), 2 November 1872, 5.
10Gavin, "Mission," 134-41.
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departmental committee of 1870.

Muscat and Zanzibar were to

be reminded of their previous agreements to suppress the slave
trade, and Frere had the power to amend the proposed treaties
if either party agreed.

In the case of Zanzibar, Britain

pledged to pay the 40,000 crowns awarded by Canning in 1861
if her Sultan agreed to suppress the slave t r a d e . ^

Frere

was also instructed to report on the most effective dispos
ition of consular officers and naval forces for ending the
slave trade, and on means of disposing of liberated slaves.

12

Frere left for his East African mission on 21 November
1872, arriving in Alexandria aboard the Enchantress on 14
December.:

After interviews with the Khedive at Cairo on the

status of the slave trade in his country, Sir Bartle left for
Zanzibar on 4 January, arriving there eight days later.

A

conversation with the Sultan on 11 February revealed that he
was stalling on the question of abolition.

The Sultan empha

sized the effect of a recent hurricane on Zanzibar, the need
for a phasing out of the slave trade, and concern about the
welfare of his Arab subjects.

Four days later Frere left for

a tour of the southern slave ports, and the next month for a
tour of the northern part of the Sultan’s dominion.

Here he

was able, in accordance with instructions from Lord Granville,
^ B . S. P ., "Correspondence Respecting Sir Bartle
F r e r e ’s Mission to the East Coast of Africa," LXI, 1872-1873,
C.-820, No. 3 (9 November 1872), 772-73.
Hereinafter
referred to as B. S. P .. C 820.

^Ibid, No. 4 (9 November 1872), 774.

to obtain renewals of treaties to suppress the slave trade
from Nukeeb Hilah-bin-Mahamed and the Nukeeb of Makallah.
The same hald true of the Sultan of Muscat, and the last
stronghold was the Sultan of Zanzibar.

This problem was

remedied in May 1873 when Lord Granville'wrote John Kirke,
British Consul at Zanzibar, to threaten the Sultan with a
blockade if a treaty to suppress the slave trade was not
signed; the treaty was signed and Kirke sent it to Lord
13
Granville the following month. ^

Frere had succeeded, at

least for the time-being, in reviving the old idea of an
informal British empire built upon the "universal applicTA
ability of British concepts of progress.”
The dispatches sent back by Sir Bartle Frere reflected
the traditional Bombay policy; in addition, they showed a
tendency to use ideas developed in India to solve a new prob
lem.

This was shown, for example, in his recommendations for

coping with slavery in Egypt.

The Khedive, in talks with

Frere, had expressed the view that it would be difficult to
ban slavery in Egypt without striking at its source.

An oiit-

right ban was not feasible because slavery had existed in
Egypt much too long before its present rulers had arrived.
"^Ibid, Nos. 6 (21 November 1872), 11 (15 December
1872), 12 *(*24""December 1872), 14 (4 January 1873), 18
(14 January 1873), 26 (15 February 1873), 30 (14 February
1873), 39 (15 March 1873), 47 (15 April 1873), 48 (16 April
1873), 49 (16 April 1873), 46 (15 May 1873), 57 (6 June 1873),
776-77, 788, 794, 806-08, 846, 859-60, 863, 858, 923.
■^Gavin, "Mission," 147.

In any case, he did not "believe that more than 400 slaves
were sold illegally in Egypt each year.

15

Sir Bartle himself

"believed that the figure was much higher, in view of the
growing affluence of the people in Lower Egypt; indeed, it
was the only way to satisfy domestic needs.

He cited, instead,

information that thousands of slaves were sold upcountry in
"rich remote provincial towns seldom visited by influential
Pranks."16
The answer to stamping out the slave trade in Egypt
depended on the fact that a larger proportion than before
was coming into Egypt from the Red Sea.

The largest contin

gent still came through the valley of the Nile by land into
Lower Egypt.

It was difficult to gauge the popularity of

the Red Sea route because there was no consular service in
the area; it was impossible to stop the Turkish ships which
carried them to get an accurate count.
however, point to a solution.

This problem did,

Britain should extend its

consular service into the area and negotiate ”with Turkey
for extended facilities of inquiry.”

Eradicating the slave

trade, from a strictly British standpoint, depended on the
extended use of the consular service, which consisted only
of a consular agent at Suez.

Such an extension would give

the Consul General more than the chance information he had
~^B. S. P .. C 820, Encl. 1 to No. 13 (1 January 1873),

778.
Ibid, Encl. 2 to No. 13 (1 January 1873), 780.
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received previously from Egyptian sources.

The first step

was to station someone nominally at Asyut, to he able to move
about the valley of the Nile and intercept slave traders.
should be young, a military officer, and a gentleman.

He

The

ability to speak Arabic was essential, but he should not be
native to the region.

A second part of the consular agency

was to consist of resident consular agents at Jiddah and
Massowah.

Permission would be needed from the Consul General

for the "Consul at Suez or any other of his subordinates11 to
check other major ports along the Red Sea at irregular intervals for evidence of slave trade or anything else significant.
In the short run, Prere advocated that the Khedive
should set up a special bureau within his police establishment
to stop any illegal slave trade in Egypt.

It would also care

for liberated slaves and keep an accurate count of liberated
and domestic slaves.

Cases of cruelty to slaves reported by

consuls would also be investigated by this unit.

The nation

ality of the person heading the unit was. not mentioned by
Prere, but he implied that he would be European,

Such an

official would be one "whose nationality, character, and
antecedents will justify the confidence of His Highness and
of all friendly Powers interested in the question."

Sir

Bartle envisioned industrial schools operated by a charity
group connected with the slave bureau, teaching a trade and
caring for liberated slave children.
17Ibid. 780-81.

18

18I b i d . 782.

17
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An end to the slave trade would be a certainty only
when slaveholding had been abolished in Egypt, possibly in
stages, with the children being freed first.

On the other

hand, continuance of slavery would ultimately lead to the
rise of a caste group, with the slaves doing all the labor.
Sir Bartle Frere believed that anyone who had seen such a
situation in India would not want to see it happen in Egypt.
Such a course only impeded progress, as had so often been
the case in India.

It was also a barrier to any Egyptian

advance towards the south, which otherwise would be the
advancement of an enlightened and civilized state.

No

European government, Frere wrote, was going to allow expan
sion of a state with such an "unnatural, hideous" evil as
slavery.

19
An argument used by Frere against slavery in Egypt

was reiterated in his discussion of slavery in Turkey.

He

noted that the Koran gave specific reasons for slavery, but
it did not include the type of indiscriminate slavery practiced in Egypt.

20

Regarding Turkey, he reminded the Earl of

Granville that certain interpretations of Moslem law took a
dim view of slavery.

Frere suggested that the Government

pressure the Porte to issue decrees enforcing such interpret
ations.

The problem in Turkey, as in Egypt, was that slave-

holding was legal; trade in slaves was supposedly illegal,
19Ibid. 782-84.

20Ibid. 781

but was definitely tolerated.

Forcing Turkey to abandon

slavery was "not a question of religion, or of political
influence, but of common humanity."

Turkey was taking a

very big chance by continuing the practice, because it could
expect no support from European governments of any political
persuasion in the future.

21

Turks failed to enforce a ban

against the slave trade because of the lack of means.

Con

cessions were needed similar to those Britain had had before
from other nations to ensure that the slave trade ban was
effective; otherwise every slave dhow plying the Red Sea was
sure to hoist the Turkish flag to ensure protection.

22

Other steps had to be taken to eradicate the slave
trade.

Frere had written, in February 1873, that all the

trade along the East Coast was in Indian hands.
the capital that financed the slave trade.

They supplied

The Rao of Kutch

had lent a willing hand in the early part of the mission by
issuing a proclamation to his subjects in Zanzibar and Muscat.
It had ordered them to desist from the slave trade, and Frere
considered it "one of the modes in which the R a o 1s aid is
likely

to be of special use."

The only way to get the Indians

out of

the slave trade, however, was to stop it; short of that,

punishment should be given out to the Indians, British subjects or not, when implicated in it.

23

For the southern part

21Ibi d. No. 17 (1 January 1873), 791-92.
22I b i d . Encl. 2 to No. 13 (1 January 1873), 781-82.
2h b i d , Nos. 31 (27 February 1873), 15 (10 January
1873), Encl. 1 to No. 51 (7 May 1873), 808-09, 788-89, 875.
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of East Africa, a consul was needed on Mozambique to spur
Portugal to action in suppressing slavery in its territories.
This would, at the same time, attract British traders and
capital to keep the slave trade in check.

The consul would

also be able to make periodic visits to the Comoro Islands
and Johanna.

Slaveholding in Northeast Africa, principally

among the Somalis, could be checked by the cultivation of
friendship by consuls at Aden and Zanzibar, and by enforceOA

ment of non-slaveholding agreements already made.
Bartie Frere had been successful at least in securing
agreements with powers in Eastern Africa on ending the slave
trade.

British interests there had once again been secured,

but what of the future?

Frere discussed that question often

in t h e .following y e ars, beginning with problems he dealt with
during his mission to Zanzibar.

In February 1873, the Earl

of Granville asked Frere his opinion of using Johanna as 11a
depot of captured slaves . . ., and as to the probability of
finding employment for them with safety to their freedom .11
Frere replied in favor of using Johanna,

25

whose inhabitants

he later referred to as the most intelligent and civilized
of any of the people of the region.
2 4 I b i d . Nos.

No doubt he had been

40 (3 April 1873), 56 (29 Kay

1873),

846, 914-lFI
2 ■’ibid, Nos. 21 (28 February 1873), 44 (7 April 1873),
798, 857.
26

Ibid, Encl. "Memorandum on Disposal of Liberated
Slaves,11 to No. 58 (7 May 1873), 896.
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impressed by its decision two months before to forbid any
further introduction of slaves and to accept freed slaves
landed by British cruisers.

27

By doing this, Johanna ful

filled two of the conditions essential, in Sir Bartle’s view,
for a liberated slave depot:

"free, self-sustaining commun

ities" and "improvement in civilization, and education of
OQ
those not too old to learn."
Certainly he was thinking
also about the Fraser estate he had observed at Kokotoni,
Zanzibar.

A collection of former slaves did all the work on
(

the estate, including operation of the machinery.
well fed and cared for medically.
Frere's mind about their behavior.

They were

Two points stood out in
Sexual depravity common

among slaves had been replaced by family life; there was
also the beginnings of the use of manufactured goods.

Fraser

also employed slaves from neighboring estates on their twoday weekly holidays, paying them prevailing wages.

What

little crime there was resulted from this influx and not from
the residents.

Frere expressed the opinion that this would

be the result of the abolition of the slave trade and the
accompanying introduction of Indian or European capital.

29

The visit to the Fraser estate had an effect on
Frere*s thinking, but it was allied with a religious outlook
2 7 Ibid. Encl.

1 to No. 34 (12 March 1873), 814.

OQ

Ibid, Encl. "Memorandum on Disposal of Liberated
Slaves," to No. 58 (7 May 1873), 887.

29Ibid. No. 25 (12 February 1873), 802-06.
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he had inherited from David Livingstone.

The latter’s work

in tropical Africa, as he himself conceived it, was not only
to convert the natives; instead, it was to diffuse the prin
ciples that had made for social progress in Britain, 11the
arts and sciences of civilisation.”

Livingstone thought that

the reason for African "backwardness was their concentration
on the material aspects of life, their ignorance, and tribal
structure, which splintered them and ’’laid /African society7
ever open to violence.”

Livingstone was in turn the inspira

tion for the University Mission to Central Africa which held
Anglo-Catholic views, a result of being founded by English
High Churchmen.

There was an emphasis on the presence of a

bishop, and the philosophy of establishing ’’centres of
Christianity and civilisation for the promotion of true
religion, agriculture and lawful commerce.”
plagued the U.M.C.A. however:

Two problems

the shortage of funds and

short tours because of bad working conditions.

30

These prob

lems were certainly in F r ere’s mind when-he later theorized
on missions generally.
Another influence on Frere was undoubtedly the Roman
Catholic missionary station at Bagamayo, along the East
African coast, which he visited, and with which he was
impressed.

The station was built upon the time-honored

-^Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa
fend ed.; London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1965), 10-13.
Hereinafter referred to as Oliver, Factor.
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principles of Catholic missions since they had started in
Europe:

civilization dispensed with religion; appointment

by Rome of mission heads; widespread giving, with allowances
made for national congregations to give to one mission in
*51
money and manpower.
These ideas were brought out by Sir
Bartle in remarks before the Church Congress of the Curch of
England in 1873.

The method used by the Church, he said, in

the years from the sixth to the thirteenth century to convert
the pagans of Northern Europe was to evangelize in the form
of a model civilized community.

This community contained all

the elements— clerical and lay— of a Christian society.
Roman Catholic and some Protestant organizations (including
the London Missionary Society) had continued the practice.
They had been quite successful, as a result, in bringing the
benefits of civilization to others.

'52

Sir Bartle Prere noted that the Church of E n g l a n d !s
missionary efforts had been heavily weighted towards the
clerical at the expense of other activities.

These activities

could be restructured to resemble the form taken by missions
in the sixth to thirteenth centuries, namely a civilized
community in which converts could live.

His own ideas would,

he believed, give the clerical element more time for preaching
rather than divert their attention from it.

As for organiz-

31 rbid, 19-20.
•20

Sir Bartle Prere, "Remarks on the Organization of
Missions to Uncivilized Populations," Official Report of the
Church Congress (Bath, 1873)» 94-95.-

l \ r

ation, a bishop would he appointed wherever there was a mixed
lay and clerical mission*

This was needed because of the

complexity of the operation and in view of the success of
mission stations of other denominations where a superior was
present.

The secular element would include such people as

doctors, nurses, linguists, schoolteachers, printers, agri
culturists, and craftsmen.

There would have to be a loosening

of bonds between the societies and missionaries, though it
would probably affect the lay more than the clerical element
of the mission.

Frere thought that the recruitment of men,

and perhaps even money, should be up to the mission itself
instead of being done by the laborious method of requesting
it through the society headquarters as previously.

Mission

efforts would be enhanced by the identification of special
parts of the country with certain missions, from the standpoint of real interest and money advanced to it.
Sir Bartle Frere looked further into the problem of
missions in Eastern Afr ica.

Use of the secular element to

assist the missionary and easing the line (often imaginary)
between service at home and abroad were possible only by
shortening the time to be spent overseas.

A limited amount

(two or three years) of missionary work was as commendable
as work on a lifetime basis.

The formation of a body to

collect material on past and present exertions of missionaries
of all religious bodies was a good idea; this in turn could

35rbid, 94-101 .

take on a form such as the Board of Foreign Missions in
America.

It should discuss and solve differences such as

territorial spheres of work, and perhaps produce a modern
translation of the Bible.

■54 .

The implications of such involvement in Africa were
also discussed by Sir Bartle Frere.

Charges of ” *equivocal

and entangling engagements *11 would be founded only if ”we
neglect our plain duty in dealing with semi-civilised or
savage neighbours.”

Protection of citizens was essential,

by friendly remonstrance or force.

In either case, the sover

eign, whether barbaric or semi-civilized, had to understand
the power and determination of Britain to protect its citizens.
Avoidance of ” *equivocal and entangling engagements*” would
be greatly facilitated by the employment of consular agents
in Africa to keep an eye on the country and Englishmen t h e r e ,
In case of war, such men would be invaluable in advising how
it should be conducted.
On East African missions in general, Sir Bartle Frere
believed that nowhere in the world at that time was there as
0
«
wide a field for missionary work.
Two factors made East
Africa unusually suitable for missionary work:

first, little

Sir Bartle Frere, Eastern Africa as a Field for
Missionary Labour:
Four Letters to His Grace the Archbis'hon
of Canterbury (London:
John Murray, 1874), 95-9&V 113-14•
Hereinafter referred to as Frere, Africa.
^ S i r Bartle Frere, Inaugural Address /to the African
Section7. Journal of the Society of Arts. XXII (November 21,
1 8 7 3 -November 13, 1874j, 204-07.
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work had been done by "Christian nations" before; and second,
no real obstacles existed to impede the growth of Christian
ity.

The Comoro Islands off the coast would provide a good

healthy place for mission stations.

Petishism was not common

in East Africa, and an absence of belief in any abstract
concepts of being was the most conspicuous aspect of the
region.

The natives were unable, it seemed, to conceive of

any non-physical object.

The problem of East African natives

was that they were, isolated from neighbors, without the type
of "basis of moral law" provided by Christianity, which was
a prerequisite for "orderly and progressive communities."
Christianity, on the other hand, contained the unifying bond
needed to bring the scattered atoms of Africans together into
progressive, unified communities.

East Africans tended

"rapidly to assimilate themselves to any more highly-civilised
race with which they may be brought into contact."
The abolition of slavery entailed reviving legitimate
commerce in Africa.

The only way to do so was through the

spread of "Christianity and Christian civilisation and enlightenment."

•2*7

In an article on Livingstone written in 1874, Sir

Bartle Prere discussed this in more detail.

He believed that,

as a result of Livingstone*s work, there would be a great
stimulation of commerce with the Africans.
^ P r e r e , A f r i c a , 9, 48, 15, 70.

57rbid, 119-

Prere was in
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complete agreement with "Livingstone’s estimate of geograph
ical discoverers as being simply the pioneers of commerce and
civilisation .11

Trade on a greater scale than ever before

would follow protection for the trader and abolition of the
slave trade.

For clothing and metal work especially the

Africans could certainly supply such raw materials as oils,
■
2
0

metal, and cotton.
Underlying the optimism of Sir Bartle Prere was a
commercial revolution in East Africa.

Abolition of the slave

trade was causing a depression in the short run, but it
would help bring prosperity to industry and trade in the long
run.

Perhaps more important was the construction of the Suez

Canal, which would put a stop to the use of transshipment
facilities on the coast.

The Sultan of Zanzibar could be the

keystone to any hope for East Africa.

He ruled over a large

area, came from a civilized race, and protected Christian
missionaries spreading civilization over East Africa.

He was

also "closely connected . . . with some of the great trading
communities of the East, and ruling over a region of unsur
passed natural capabilities, he may reasonably hope for a
great destiny awaiting his race in Eastern Africa."
Salvation of East Africa, therefore, was commerce.
coal and an abundant supply of labor*
to the capitalist.

The
It had

Both were attractive

Any government, whether in South Africa,

^8Sir H. B. E. Prere,
(1874), 283-85*

"Dr. Livingstone,” G-ood Words
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the Portuguese possessions, or the area in the north under
the Sultan of Zanzibar, could insure its prosperity through
"protection of life and property*"

This was very important

to Prere, because he believed that the uncivilized nature of
the African natives could be traced to their isolation, some
thing that should cease now that they had met with civilized
peoples.

Negroes who had had only a "very imperfect amount

of civilisation" through conversion to Islam showed marked
physical and moral improvement.

The rewards that could

follow from conversion to Christianity, a greater civilizing
force than Islam, could be expected to be even greater.
Sir Bartle Prere played an important role in the
development of thought first laid down by Livingstone.

He

had put the arts of civilization on a plane with the religious
message, whereas Livingstone wanted the former only as a
preliminary to the latter.
however.

P r ere1s ideas were not popular,

They brought down the wrath of the evangelicals in

both England and Germany upon him.

Being old-fashioned, they

wanted only the message carried and nothing else.

Preretown

was Established in 1 8 7 5 to follow his ideas, but was never
thought by its mother society, the Church Missionary Society,
to be an exceptional case of mission work.
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^ S i r H. B. E. Prere, "Zanzibar A Commercial Power,"
Macmillanys Magazine, XXXII (July 1875), 287-08.
^°Prere, "Dr. Livingstone," 284.

^Oliver, Pactor. 23-25.

The importance of Frere*s thoughts on Eastern Africa
and Africa in general lay in their potential applicability
to South Africa.

It was questionable what course Frere would

take if some Africans disagreed with his theory and refused
to submit to civilizing influences.

It was precisely this

question he had to deal with in South Africa some years later.

CHAPTER VI
SOUTH AFRICA
The career of Sir Bartle Frere in South Africa is
the beginning of a story that would take years to unfold.
He was not the first to attempt a policy of confederation of
the South African states, but it was the first time it had
a fair chance of success.

It was, in this instance, to be a

failure, but in 1910 was finally brought to fruition.

The

story of Frere in Africa, then, is a very important part of
South African history; it inspired both South Africans and
students of British Empire to try again some twenty-five
years later.
Interestingly enough, the majority of past, present
and future participants in South African confederation were
present at a banquet held for Frere in London on 28 February
1877.

Hosted by a group of Natal merchants and "others inter

ested in South Africa,” it was given to celebrate Frere*s
appointment as Governor of the Cape Colony.

Among those

present were the Earl of Kimberley, Earl of Carnarvon, and
Marquis of Salisbury .1

The original impetus for confederation

of Dutch and British states in South Africa had come from the
^he

Times (London), 1 March 1877, 6 .
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Governor of the Cape Colony and High Commissioner for South
Africa, Sir George Grey, in 1859.

He was firmly rebuffed by
2
the Colonial Office the next year*
The Earl of Kimberley

had already served in various positions of government, includ'
ing service in the Eoreign Office, Undersecretary for India,
and Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland.

From 1870 to 1874 he had

been Colonial Secretary in Gladstone’s first administration.
The Cape Colony had been awarded responsible government in
1872; Kimberley subsequently noted that possibly the Orange
Free State and the Transvaal would like to confederate with
the Cape Colony.

During the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 he

opposed, but did not split with, the Liberals as a result of
Gladstone's Russian bias.

Kimberley could therefore be con

sidered an exponent' o f .confederation by evolution.
The Earl of Carnarvon had followed Kimberley's lead
in trying to federate South Africa.

He was experienced at

the Colonial Office, having been Secretary from 1858 to 1859
and from 1866 to 1867 in both administrations of Lord Derby.
Carnarvon was deeply interested in colonial matters and in
exploring ways of binding Britain and its colonies closer
together.

He had introduced the bill to federate Canada

before his resignation in March 1867 over differences with
2
Arthur Percival Newton, ed., Select Documents Relat
ing to the Unification of 3outh Africa (£ v o l s . ; London:
Frank Cass .& Co., 1968), 1-12.
Hereinafter referred to as
Newton, Unification.
•

•

•

•

Lloyd Charles Sanders, "Wodehouse, John,” D. N. B .,
Supplement, 1901-1911, III, 695-96.
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Disraeli, and had seen it pass into law the following June,
While the Conservatives were out of office from December 1868
to January 1874# Carnarvon had expanded his horizons and urged
the creation of a federated British Empire.^

Returning to

office with the Conservatives in February 1874# he became
Colonial Secretary once again.

Carnarvon set to work in

earnest on South African confederation.

He tried from 1875

until 1876 to arrange a conference of the African states to
discuss common native problems and his ideas for confederation.
It came to nothing.

The Cape Colony pleaded that a conference

would only exacerbate problems between its eastern and western
sections, and the Orange Free State refused to attend.

When

Carnarvon suggested changing the venue from the Cape to London,
there was even more trouble.

The Orange Free State refused

to discuss anything but native problems, the Cape went unrep
resented over what they considered unconstitutional pressures
for confederation, and the South African Republic declined
5
to discuss the proposition.
The appointment of Sir Bartle Frere as Governor and
High Commissioner was only one stage of a final three-pronged
effort by Carnarvon to implement his policy of confederation.
Two other moves by Carnarvon reinforced his hand:

first, Sir

Theophilus Shepstone declared British sovereignty in April
1877 over the Transvaal (on the assumption that the Orange
^"Sidney Lee, "Herbert, Henry Howard Molyneux," D. N. B . ,
IX, 6 4 6 - 4 8 .
Newton, Unification. 18-43#

Free State would also be forced to join in a federated South
Africa); second, the South Africa Act was passed in August
1 8 7 7 , erecting a framework on which federation could proceed*

Frere had been agreeable to the Cape governorship.

6

He had

already given his opinion in 1874 that the Cape Colony was
Mone of the most important colonial possessions of the
British Empire,” and a possible rival to Australia in the
7
future.
One of the first difficulties Frere faced when he
arrived in South Africa was the Ministry of John Molteno.
Carnarvon had said, in remarks at the Langham Hotel banquet,
that Frere ”goes out not as the Governor of a Crown Colony,
but as one who will have to carry on the task of government
in conjunction with local advisers,” . No qualifications were
Q
made,
but Frere replaced Henry Barkly as High Commissioner
and Governor of the Cape Colony because the latter had fallen
too much under the influence of Molteno.

9

Frere finally had

to break the hold of the Ministry, and did it in a roundabout
way.

It began on 10 August 1877, after an outbreak of fight

ing between the Fingo and Galeka tribes at a marriage feast
in Fingo territory.

The Galekas involved in the fight belonged

to a tribe ruled by Kreli.
6 C. H. B . E .. VIII,

Skirmishing soon broke out along
467-73.

7

Frere, "Inaugural Address,” 204*

SThe T i m e s ,(London), 1 March 1877, 6 .

9C. H. B. E.. VIII, 472.

the borders of the two g r o u p s . ^

The Cape Colony became

actively involved on 26 September 1877, when the Galekas
attacked a detachment of Frontier Armed Mounted Police, under
Commander Griffith, and Fingo allies barely inside the Cape
border with Kreli's Country.

This particular force was driven

back with heavy losses into their own territory, and in a
general advance on 9 October, Commander Griffith burned
Kreli*s kraal.

It looked for a time as if Kreli might ask

for terms; this hope was shattered, however, when the Galekas
slipped back across the Bashee and returned to their old
homesteads as the colonials withdrew.

The 24th Regiment was

sent to reinforce G r i f f i t h , ^ and reports circulated of plans
by Kreli to infilitrate the Cape Colony and incite the Gaikas.
It was against the background of the Galeka uprising
that Frere became involved in an important constitutional
t

question concerning the definition of the power of a colonial
governor.

The situation came about, Frere wrote, when the

Molteno Ministry pushed for a campaign in the Tambookie under
exclusive colonial control.

They wanted to create the office

. S . P .. "Further Correspondence Respecting the
Affairs of South A f r i c a ,11 LV, 1878, C.-1961, No. 23 (28 August
1877), 560-61.
Hereinafter referred to as B. S. P .. C 1961.
1 ;LIbid,

1877)

r

Nos* 37 (20 October 1877)i 45 (16 October
i u T T I December 1877), 586, 613, 734.

Ibid, "Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs
of South Africa," LY, 1878, C.-2000, No. 22 (12 December 1877)
786.
Hereinafter referred to as B. S. P ., C 2000.

of Commanding General of Colonial Forces, under Commandant
Griffith,

He would control independent commands of colonials

conducting active operations,

Griffith himself was to be

outside any other command structure.

13

This represented

only one step from a previous arrangement whereby Griffith
had considerable autonomy for his command east of the Kei.
He did, however, receive “intimations” and forward reports
to General Sir Arthur Cunynghame, who was in overall c o m m a n d . ^
It was not, however, a step Frere was ready to take.

He

turned the idea of “law and usage” on the proposal of the
Ministry by writing that it negated any contention by Molteno
that colonial forces could not be commanded by regular British
officers.

He explicitly reminded them of the recent Transkei

campaign when Commandant Griffith was subordinate to the
Commander of the Forces.

There was, he continued, no real

distinction between colonial and British forces, because
both ultimately fell under the command of a Governor as
Commander-in-Chief.

The relationship of the Governor to his

ministers was to take their advice and record his opposition
13

B.
S . P .« “Further Correspondence Respecting the
Affairs of South Africa," LV, 1878, C.-2079, Nos. 53
(5 February 1878), 42 (24 January 1878), 97, 71. Hereinafter
referred to as B. S. P ., C 2079.
■^George McCall Theal, History of South Africa from
1873 to 1884:
Twelve Eventful Years (2 v o l s .; London;
George Allen & Unwin, 1919), I, 64. Hereinafter referred to
as Theal, History.

if lie had a valid reason for doing so.
followed such a course.

He felt that he had

15

The Molteno Ministry replied to P r e r e fs remarks on
2 Pebruary 1878.

Their minute asserted that the cabinet was

entrusted by the Cape Parliament with the conduct of govern
mental business.

This gave it collective control over milit

ary operations in the field and it could delegate such
authority to any one of the ministers, including the Commiss
ioner of Crown Lands and Public Works.

Colonial forces had

to be formally placed under the control of General Cunynghame
for him to excercise any authority over them.

Only if that

were done by the Cape Government could authority be effective
over any part of the colonyfs population.

Relying on preced

ent, the minute noted it would be a complete reversal if
command of military operations, for which the colony was
paying, was turned over to imperial officers.
nor ministers would tolerate such a step.

Neither colony

Military operations

conducted in the name and with the money of the Cape Colony
necessitated the naming of the commander of such operations
by the Ministry.

The Government ensured that it controlled

such operations only by using this prerogative.

16

In his

f,Minute from the Governor in answer to Minute of Mr. Molteno,
dated Pebruary 2, 1878” Prere referred to his Indian experi1 5 B.

s. p.. C 2079. Encl. 1 to No. 86 (11 May 1878),

209.
16Ibid. 214-15.

ences.

He wrote that there were no colonial or regular

troops in South Africa, except as a colloquial expression.
As British troops in India were part of the Indian army, so
was also the case in South Africa.

Frere admitted only a

difference in the way the South African and Indian armies
were financed; ultimately the South African army was the
responsibility of the South African Ministry as the Indian
army was the responsibility of the Indian Ministry.

The

crucial note sounded in F r e r e 1s minute was, however, that
any authority the Ministry possessed was through the
Governor.*^
Frere wrote to Carnarvon on 5 February 1878 that the
note of 2 February given to him by the Molteno Ministry (at
a meeting of the Executive Council) brought their downfall.
Complete control over military affairs by any cabinet member
was extremely risky, and would have resulted in sending the
Governor, Commander of Forces, and Imperial troops from the
battle scene.

Such a course Frere was unwilling to follow,

with its possibility of danger to the Eastern Province.
Molteno Ministry was dismissed and J. G. Sprigg chosen to
18
form a new government.
Sir Bartle later summed up his
reasons for the dismissal.

General Sir Arthur Cunynghame

had, from the beginning of hostilities, held command of
colonial forces, the ministers being notified formally of
1 7 I b i d , Encl.

2, 217.

■'■®Ibid, No. 54 (5 February 1878), 103.
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this on 20 October 1877.

It was not until 2 Pebruary that

formal notification of opposition was given by the Molteno
Ministry,

The result was that the Governor as Commander-in-

Chief had to use the constitutional powers at his disposal
when the ministers insisted on divided command of a common
area of operations.

19

As Prere noted in a letter to R. W.

Herbert, his logic in the dismissal was as follows:

it was,

as a rule,, up to the Parliament to choose ministers, but due .
to the prospect of two or three months of ” ’unchecked Kaffir
Civil W a r , 1” a stand for the preservation of the constitution
had to be taken; therefore he ’’’asserted an important prerogative of the crown . 111

20

Opinion at the time and since has been divided over
the actions of Prere in dismissing the Molteno Ministry.
J. X. Merriman was blunt, contending that ”it does away with
any kind of safeguard which Responsible Government was sup
posed to confer, for it is manifest that a Governor who can
dismiss his ministers at will and in a huff is much less
controlled than if those ministers were honest Executive

21

Officers.”

Clement Goodfellow, a writer on attempts at

confederation at the time, believes that there was no con1 9 I b i d . No.

87 (21 May 1873), 252.

■Frere to Herbert (20 Pebruary 1878), Martineau,
Prere, II, 212.
21
.......
Phyllis lev/sen, ed., Selections from the Corres
pondence of J . X . Merriman, 1870-1890 (Cape Town:
Van Riebeck
Society, 19^0), 41*1
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spiracy against Molteno and in support of Sprigg, who was
more inclined towards federalism.

He thinks, instead, that

Molteno was ousted because his actions could prolong the
Kaffir War, thus hindering the movement towards confederation.
Molteno was dismissed for attempting what every Secretary of
State had urged the colonists to do previously, namely take
over their own defense.

22

The most detailed study of Frere and the ministerial
crisis agrees with G-oodfellow only partially.

Phyllis Lewsen

argues that the dismissal was connected with confederation,
but was more involved.

Frere recognized the need to use

force if necessary to implement confederation.

Worried about

the Zulu threat to the Transvaal, he used the G-aika attack
as an excuse to get more troops.

When Molteno refused to

sanction such a move, Frere fired him.

The Tambookie situ

ation, Lewsen contends, was overemphasized by Frere and did
not constitute a serious enough charge to dismiss the Molteno
Ministry.

Started by an over-zealous Merriman who was worried

about the loyalty of a certain chief, it was quelled by
Griffith in a few days.

It was certainly not worthy of the

talents of a General Cunynghame.

The genesis of the minister

ial crisis had been on 30 December 1877, when Frere asked
Molteno to confirm a request for new troops.
22

When Molteno

Francis Clement Goodfellow, Great Britain and Con
federation, 1870-1881 (Cape Town:
Oxford University Press,
1 $-6 6 ), 1 5 4 - 5 5 . Hereinafter referred to as Goodfellow,
Confederation.
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refused, Prere sent the request on anyway.

The crisis itself

took shape on 31 January 1878, when Prere sent down an affirm
ative reply to his troop request, and asked the Ministry to
sign the colonial treasury warrants.
same day was the ministers 1 reply.

A minute dated the
An embarrassed Prere then

replied with his own minute the same day.

He used a handy

excuse, dual command, to bring on a confrontation.

23

Molteno himself, lewsen believes, was correct in
theory about a separate colonial command; however, with
imperial forces engaged in the Transkei, it was practicably
impossible.

Molteno therefore foresaw the creation of a

separate colonial command, formed later in 1879.

The Governor

also had to act with the advice of his Executive Council in
matters of colonial defense.

Prere, on the other hand, was

correct in demanding a single command; at the same time he
overdramatized to the Colonial Office the opposition of the
Molteno Ministry to it and the possible results.

In the end,

* Prere constituted a new threat tp responsible government.

It

survived him, however, because of the failure of confederation.
The principle for which Molteno fought was later enshrined in
Dominion s t a t u s . ^
23
^Phyllis lewsen, nThe Pirst Crisis in Responsible
Government in the Cape Colony,” Archives Yearbook for South
African History^ Part II (Cape Town:
Minister of the
Interior, 1 9 4 3 ; 9 248-52.

24rbid, 256-57, 261 .

Lord Carnarvon had written to Prere in December 1876
that he envisioned the larger part of Africa under nominal
British control, thereby excluding other national aspirants.
Approximately one year later Prere suggested a plan to the
Colonial Office which tested this idea.

Prere envisioned a

protectorate stretching from the Atlantic on the west to the
Transvaal-Portuguese border, and again as far north as the
Portuguese possessions.

He requested that at least Walwich

Bay be brought under immediate control, because good harbors
were scarce to the north of it.

The Boers had already

trekked into the region; there was always the possibility
that a trekking Boer might create another Boer republic
either east or west of the Transvaal.

The British would
26
then have another Transvaal problem on their hands.
The
Colonial Office, however, was put in a real quandary because
they neither saw the possibility of foreign intervention nor
wanted the expense of governing the new annexation.

If a

problem such as this could throw the Colonial Office into
such confusion, it is questionable just how far one could
label subsequent acts of Prere as deliberate disobedience;
perhaps they should instead be viewed in the context of the
imperial expansion he championed.

He was therefore no more

25

^Goodfellow, C o n f e d e r a t i o n 117.

2 6 B.
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s. p .. C 2000, No. 1 (13 November 1877), 743,

25
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successful

27

with an appeal to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach,

successor to Carnarvon, to establish a protectorate.

28

Before confederation could be assured, Sir Bartle
Frere believed that first the native problem would have to
be solved.

This meant dealing first with the Pondos and then

most certainly with the Zulus.

29

Concerning the Pondos,

Frere could report by September 1878 that the problem had
been solved by the capture of the St. John River estuary the
preceding month.

He considered it to be especially signifi

cant in case of trouble with Zulus, because British forces
30
would not be attacked from the rear.-'
The message to HicksBeach meant, therefore, that he believed war with the Zulus
to be imminent.

Two months previously, he had requested

that his powers as High Commissioner be expanded.

He wanted

a secretariat, but most of all Deputy Commissioners, report
ing directly to him while stationed among the independent
"31
African tribes.
Obviously something was on Frere's mind.
That something was the Zulus.
27
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The problem between Sir Bartle Frere and the Zulus
can be traced back to a year earlier.

In October 1877, Sir

Theophilus Shepstone had gone to a conference with them,
hoping to obtain a boundary settlement favorable to the
Transvaal.

He was treated quite rudely by the Zulus, who

remembered him taking their side formerly while he had been
native administrator in Natal.

The result was that Shepstone

became a fanatical upholder of the Boer claim, and he warned
Frere at the same time about the Zulu menace.

Frere was

placed in a difficult situation because Shepstone was speak
ing about the one subject, native affairs, on which he was
supposedly an expert.

Shepstone had also written that defin

ite proof of the Dutch claim would be forthcoming.

Although

proof was never sent, Frere expected a favorable verdict
from the boundary commission formed at the request of Lieu
tenant Governor Bulwer of Natal.
a victory for the Zulu claim.

Its verdict was, however,

If sustained, it would result

in a Boer revolt and the native uprising feared by Frere was
32
certain to come.
As one writer has noted, the subjugation of the
African tribes had a qualification.

It was to be for a pol

itical end, namely confederation, and was not to be social
subjugation.

Such a policy was the reflection of what had

^ D o n a l d R. Morris, The Washing of the Spears:
A
History of the Rise of the Zulu Nation under Shaka and its •
Fall in the Zulu War of 1879 (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1965),
26^-71, 274. Hereinafter referred to as Morris, Spears.
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been termed "civilizing policy” in the days of Sir George
Grey.^

Throughout 1878 Sir Bartle Prere spelled out what

such a course meant.

His opinion v/as that the tribes could

be "'made to take all the cost and much of the labour of
their own government, but the impulse and the standards of
‘34-

right and wrong must be European. 1,1

Most necessary for

permanent progress to be made was a strong central govern
ment.^

There was also the problem, as in India, of getting

the natives to "protect themselves against themselves."

36

Gun-carrying among the Kaffirs should be prohibited; courts
and police could replace the system of fines with a civilized
concept of offenses against society.

A fundamental change,

Prere thought, was to curtail the arbitrary rule of"the chief
in order to provide for "reasonable security for life and
property."

A corollary to this would be the provision for

individual landholding.

There was, however, a limit to how

fast such measures could be accomplished.

As Prere wrote,

"change, like all great revolutions requires time and patience
to effect peacefully.
Another change which Sir Bartle Frere favored in
South Africa was the development of an integrated civil serv33

Goodfellow, Confederation. 166.
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ice.

A dispatch dated 1 June 1878 painted the picture,

familiar in India, of the educated native in a very lonely
position socially.

Often employed as teachers and in com

merce, they were seldom found in the civil service.

No South

African native civil service comparable to that in India had
ever existed and would have to be built from scratch.

The

employment of educated natives had been limited to positions
such as clerks and interpreters in government offices, not
responsible positions such as magistrates and revenue officers
on educational merit.

Frere thought that the use of educated

South African native public servants in native kraals would
be a distinct improvement over what then existed.

Having

uneducated chiefs exercise arbitrary police functions was a
70

disaster, when educated natives could be used instead.
When Frere received the boundary commission report
in July 1878, he began to devise means to delay its award
and prepared for war.

He sent General Thesiger to inspect

Natal defenses, which the latter deemed very poor.

There

were too many places for the Zulus to cross and the defense
force was inadequate.

Thesiger recommended the invasion of

Zululand instead of defense.

If Frere himself was having

any second thoughts about what to do, they were dispelled by
38
^ Ibid, "Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs
of South Africa," 1VI, 1878, C.-2144, No. 107 (1 June 1878),
606, 609. Hereinafter referred to as C 2144.

^Morris, Spears, 275.

a visit he made in September 1878 to N a t a l . ^

He was besieged

in Durban by people concerned about the Zulu threat.

They

impressed upon him the ^urgent necessity for protective and
precautionary measures.

Missionaries, laymen, merchants,

farmers— all met him with the same story and the same appeal.”
One contemporary writer summed up the general attitude:

!fThe

Zulu nation is a bugbear, and the sooner Bogy is got rid of
the b e t t e r . A t

the end of the month, Sir Bartle sent

Hicks-Beach a dispatch emphasizing the warlike behavior of
the Zulus of late and declaring that they were only waiting
for a good opportunity to put the British in the wrong by
some means before attacking.

He also emphasized the essential

indefensibility of both the Cape and Natal.
One point in Frere*s dispatch of 30 September 1878
stood out from everything else.

This was the confirmation

of a report that two women had been dragged back across the
Natal border to be murdered.

The culprits had been two sons

of Sirayo, a Zulu whom Frere described as very anti-British
and who had recently come into favor with Cetewayo, the Zulu
king.

Frere thought no fine was enough for the act, because
40
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it was ”incompatible with, national honour as with the future
safety of Her Majesty*s Colony.”

The Boers were most cer

tainly watching, and he reminded Hicks-Beach that it was
because President Burgers could not put down Sikukuni’s
rebellion that the viability of the Transvaal Republic had
ended.

The

stakes were high, for

the future peace of this part of Africa and its progress
in civilization both depend on the issue.
It is not
national pride, but the interests of humanity which
forbid our acquiescing in failure, or even in delayed
success.
Later, in a dispatch of 6 October 1878, Prere mentioned two
more incidents that afforded serious attention, namely the
detention of two surveyors just inside the Natal border and
the ejection of farmers from their land at Luneburg and
Bivana by the Z u l u s I f

his attitude towards the Zulus

hardened in September,

it is not difficult

to understand why

from these incidents.

They had violated a fixed British line

twice, and,

remembering his views on Afghanistan,

it is

obvious why

Frere took a dim view of such an occurrence;

the

Zulus had also violated the principle of civilized behavior
that Frere had spent a lifetime trying to encourage and which
he hoped to instill in
The request by

the South African native.
Frere for troops in

late 1878 had the

concurrence of Hicks-Beach, but was opposed by Disraeli.
44Tbid, C 2220, Nos. 105 (30 September 1878), 111
(6 October-1878), 294, 296, 298, 305.

As

45

a result, only special service officers were sent. ^

Sir

Bartie was advised to send the troops he had to the Natal
and Transvaal borders for defense.

Hicks-Beach was sending

more troops a month later, but felt that the peace could be
maintained.^

The boundary award to the Zulus was finally

made on 11 December 1878, but with conditions attached which
were to be affirmed in thirty days.

They included the sur

render of those responsible for the murder of the two women
within twenty days; a fine for detaining the two surveyors;
trial of Zulus accused of criminal acts, with the right of
appeal to the Zulu king; return of the missionaries driven
away; disarming and dismissal of the Zulu army; the admission
of a Government Resident .

^

The Resident was included, Brere

wrote, because Cetewayo was too unreliable for a treaty to
be made with him.

The demands were a combination of B r e r e ’s

ideas on a new native society and retribution for offensive
acts already perpetrated.

He was enforcing, as was his way,

moral superiority and superior force to right past and possi
ble future wrongs.
4.5

Zulu and Briton could be separate but

Monypenny and Buckle, Beaconsfield. VI, 420.

46B. s . p .. C 2220, Hos. 92A (17 October 1878), 119
(21 November 1878), 289, 336.
^ T h e a l , History. I, .304.
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peaceful only as long as one recognized the superior power
of the other.

It could not happen while Cetewayo headed the

Zulus.48
Hicks-Beach was certain that Frere was heading for
war, and he confessed to Disraeli his inability to control
him.

His one hope was that with the swift defeat of the Zulus
4.9
the Boers would be quiescent.
The Cape was indeed prepar—

ing for war,

SO

and Frere gave Lord Chelmsford responsibility

for enforcing the demands on the Zulus.

51

Disaster followed.

An element of the British force invading Zululand was destroyed
at Isandhlwana, and a fierce public descended upon the
Disraeli Government.

52

The cabinet issued a charge of cen55
sure against Frere on 19 March 1879,
ana major discussions

were held in both the House of Lords and House of Commons.
Radical Liberals were old opponents of Carnarvon’s confeder54.
ation s c h e m e ^ and Sir Charles Dilke had written a letter to
4-8
B. S. P ., ’’Further Correspondence Respecting the
Affairs of South Africa ’* LII, 1878-1879. C.-2222, Nos. 45
(10 December 1878), 54 (14 December 1878;, 616, 643-45.
^ M o n y p e n n y and Buckle, Beaconsfield, VI, 421, 423.
^°The Times (London), 6 January 1879, 6.
51
B. S. P ., ’’Further Papers Respecting the Affairs
of South Africa,*' LII, 1878-1879, C.-2242, No. 1 (6 January
1879), 679.
^ E n s o r , England, 60-61.
^^Monypenny and Buckle, Beaconsfield, VI, 425-26.
^Goodfellow, Confederation, 138.
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i'*ie Spectator opposing it.

He introduced a motion in the
c£

House of Commons expressing regret at Frere retaining office,
only to see it discussed first in the House of Lords where
Lord Lansdown introduced it verbatim.

57

Lansdown set the

tone of the Liberal attack in the Lords when he observed that
the actions of Frere had violated previous British policy of
teaching savages civilized ways through good administration
and example.
the sword.

It was a peaceful policy, not one depending on
Lord Kimberley wondered why Frere was not recalled

as he had completely disobeyed the Secretary; more important,
however, was the fact that it was wrong to remove confidence
in a man by censure but not remove him.

Sir Robert Peel

possibly raised the most basic question when he observed that
the Zulu War was neither na just or necessary w ar.”

58

The speech by Lilke on his motion was given two days
after that of Lord Lansdown in the House of Lords.

Congrat

ulated afterwards by men from both sides of the aisle, he
called it his 111greatest success.fn

59

Lilke*s basic line of

55

Stephen Gwynn and Gertrude M. Tuckwell, The Life of
the Rtv Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke (2 vols.; New York:
Macmillan Company, 1917), I, 271-72.
Hereinafter referred
to as Gwynn and Tuckwell, L i l k e .
56

Great Britain. Hansard*s Parliamentary Lebates. 3rd
ser., Vol. 244 (3 March-28 March, 1879;, col. 1365.
Herein
after referred to as Hansard.
^ G w y n n and Tuckwell, Lilke, 273.
^^Hansard, 3rd ser.. Vol. 244 (3 March-28 March, 1879).
cols. 1620, 167£-73, 2022.
Gwynn and Tuckwell, Lilke. 274-75.

101

thought was summed up in the question:

”Was it not the more

prudent course to follow, instead of exhibiting a knighterrand boldness, for an English statesman to act in a spirit
of watchful care?”

60

Joseph Chamberlain was opposed to the

new imperialism that Frere and Chelmsford represented, because
61
of the onerous responsibility it would impose.
Practicable
points were made:

Natal had taken prisoners from Zululand

by force before (in reference to the two women); and the
two surveyors were military spies, Frere having already
decided on invasion.
to missionaries.

One member considered Frere too partial

In his opinion, "they should not be under

the impression that the country was prepared to spend blood
62
and treasure in assisting them, wherever they might go.”
The Marquis of Salisbury had reiterated the case of the
Government in the Lords by saying that the Government did not
want to question the policy of Sir Eartle Frere in the middle
of a war; they did want him to understand that ”Her Maj e s t y 1s
Advisers, and they only, must decide the grave issues of peace
and war.”

Salisbury could not help but admire Frere and

added a postscript that characterized his own policy years
later, namely that rules of normal diplomacy did not always
apply in areas such as South Africa.

The formula that had

^°Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 244 (3 March-28 March,
1879), col. 1885.
61Ibid, col. 1916.
62I*>id. cols. 1877-78, 2087-88.
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made the Empire great and would continue to do so was "boldness, boldness, and always boldness.”

63

Sir Bartle Frere rendered Bis own defense in a dis
patch to Hicks-Beach on 30 June 1879.

He described himself

as captain of a ship caught at sea in a hurricane.

On shore,

the owners of the ship were trying to direct the captain’s
movements, a rather impossible situation; but it was what
the people of Britain were trying to do with their colonial
administrators.

On the practical side, Frere complained of

the lack of consideration given by the boundary commission
to the welfare of the Boer families in the lands awarded to
the Zulus.

”1 made,” he wrote, ”such provision as I thought

would be adequate to secure the rights of property of civil
ised men.”

The other reason for imposing the demands on the

Zulus, Frere contended, was the murder of the two women
dragged across the Natal border.

"They were human beings,

who had managed to escape into British territory, and there
believed themselves to be, (as we should, if asked, have told
them they were) protected by British law and by the determin
ation of British men, that British power should be employed
to its upmost to defend those under British protection, and
enforce British law."

The description Frere gave of Cetewayo

as "a blood-thirsty barbarian, utterly opposed to European
63Ibid. cols.
Salisbury was
in 1885.
Chamberlain
cabinet (1895-1902).

1679-80.
Prime Minister three times, beginning
was the Colonial Secretary in his last
Ensor, England« 608-11.
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civilized ideas and ways" was everything Frere had ever
64.
fought against*
The most stinging criticism of the policy enunciated
by Frere in Afghanistan and South Africa came from Gladstone
during his Midlothian campaigns in Scotland in 1879 and
66
1880, ^ described as the "best summary of the Liberal doctrine
66
on world policy."
He deprecated the annexation of the
Transvaal, noting that 6,500 of its 8,000 electors had signed
a petition against it.

The Zulus had acted as patriots, only

to be mowed down by the best weapons European science could
supply.

The actions taken in both South Africa and Afghan

istan were wrong:
V/e had no business to go there with these gratuitous
and unnecessary difficulties, disturbing confidence,
perplexing business, unsettling the fabric of civilised
society through the world.
We had no business to take
those engagements when our hands were full.
But I
contend, also that the engagements were bad; and that
being bad, we ought not to have undertaken them, even
if our hands, instead of being full, had been perfectly
empty.67
The election that was fought in Britain in 1880 was
a victory for Gladstone and the Liberals, but it had results
unforeseen at that time.

The recall of Sir Bartle Frere in

64.
\B, S. P., "Further Correspondence Respecting the
Affairs of South Africa," LIV, 1878-1879, C.-2454, Ho. 54
(30 June 1879), 298-99, 302-03.
^ E n s o r , England, 63-64.
^Thornton,
York:

Idea, 43.

E, Gladstone, Midlothian Speeches, 1879 (Hew
Humanities Press, 1971), 48-49, 91, 63.
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August 1880, after the concept of confederation had been
rejected by the Cape Parliament, led to a Boer revolt.
Neither was the Transvaal disannexed as Gladstone had wanted,
nor was it given the self-government under the Crown that
Frere envisioned; the Transvaal was given independence, and
the dropping of the word "suzerainty” (over the Boers by the
British) by the Convention of London in 1884 led to another
twenty years of strife.

On the other hand, Gladstone's

Midlothian speeches showed he did not yet comprehend that
the tenet of imperialism could not be held back, for it was
already a "public state of mind in Europe.”

Joseph

Chamberlain soon reflected such a state of mind.
opinion, political and economic control were one.

In his
He con

ceived of the Foreign and Colonial Offices as seekers of new
markets and protectors of the old ones.

If reminded that

commerce with British colonies was not vital to the mother
country, Chamberlain would expound B ritain’s role as trustee
and propagator of civilization.
quite simple:

His colonial policy was

keep current possessions, covet what looked

good for the future, and fight anyone who disagreed.

69

The Liberals themselves were unable to stop the
imperialist advance, and the imperialists looked for any
chance to damage their foe.

The best chance came with the

^ E n s o r , England. 64, 68-69.

^Thornton, Idea. 43, 104-05, 99-100.
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"khaki election" of 1900, twenty years after Midlothian.

70

But the true strength of the imperial impulse was shown with
the annexation of the two Boer republics— Orange Free State
and Transvaal— in the early 1900s.

As John Strachey has

pointed out however, it was not so much the accomplishment
of Rhodes and Chamberlain as of Sir Alfred Milner, the
administrator, with his unequaled determination.

71

Appointed

to his post as High Commissioner for South Africa in 1897,
Milner had been imbued with the imperialist spirit as a
result of working with Cromer in Egypt and observing the
benefits of British rule.

72

British colonial policy had come

full circle and Milner, the administrator, had succeeded
where Frere, the administrator, had failed.

The idea for

which Frere had fought had become a reality.
There is another question to answer, namely F r e r e fs
place in history.

Sir Reginald Copeland has ranked Frere

among the three ablest men sent to South Africa by the
British Government, Sir George Grey and Viscount Milner
being the other two.

He even thought it possible that with

success in Zululand Frere could have avoided the continued
strife in South Africa.

7 rz

Whether or not this was possible

70Ibid, 46-47.
^Strachey,

The End of Empire. 91.

72Ensor, England, 245*
7 ^Sir Reginald Coupland, Zulu Battle Piece:
Isandhlwana (London:
John Murr a y , 1896), 133-54*
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at the time, Erere earned the ingratitude of an experienced
colonial administrator of the day, Lord Blachford.

The latter

complained that Erere had no idea as to how colonial govern
ment was conducted, conceiving his ignorance to be "superior
knowledge*In

a way, Lord Blachford was right, for as

another writer has explained, Erere "belonged to the new
generation of imperialists announced by Livingstone and
realized by Chamberlain."

75

They did not want to know about

the old way of handling colonial affairs; they already had
their program.

Some years, later, Cecil Rhodes spoke of how

new states had been carved out in South Africa, and how the
Afrikander Bond had tried to alleviate differences between
them.

One excerpt is very enlightening:

I might say there is no difference between the policy
of Sir Bartle Erere and the policy of the Afrikander Bond.
If that had been stated at the time Sir Bartle Erere was
Governor of the Cape Colony, it would have been met with
laughter; but now you receive the statement in all serious
ness, recognizing its truth. People are beginning to see
that this is the grand central idea.
He had also said six years earlier that the "union

l o t

South

Africa/ is not to be reached as the late Sir Bartle Erere
77
wanted to reach to Zambesi— all in a minute.”
"^George Eden Marindin, Letters of Erederic Lord
Blachford (London:
John Murray,.
.1896 ) , 394.
'
^ D e Kiewiet, Imperial, 127#
^ V i n d e x /E. Tetschoyle/, Cecil Rhodes:
His Political
Life and Speeches (London:
Chapman and Hal1 , 1 9 0 0 ) , 269.

77Ibid. 114.

CONCLUSION
The roots of Victorian imperialism are to be found,
to a considerable degree, in British India, and it was there
that its character was largely molded.

One of the most

prominent characteristics of Victorian imperialism was the
emphasis on civilized progress.

Public works, a basic human

endeavor, were a good example of that principle.

They were

carried out for the benefit of the people of India.

The

British administrator, as exemplified by Sir Bartle Prere,
was pragmatic about them.

Roads, he theorized, led to trade,

and trade to a better life for the Indians.
ings were also a factor in public works.

Humanistic feelAs an adminis

trator, Prere saw no problem in combining the two factors.
No compulsion was placed on the natives by the emphasis on
public works; instead, British administration v/as providing
the basis on which the Indians would construct a new and
better India.

In large part, the administrators were success

ful, as they laid the foundation for m o d e m industry in India.
They erred, however, by touching on Indian sensibilities.
It was this mistake that led to the Indian Mutiny in 1857,
which transferred governmental power from the old East India
Company to the British Government.

^Supra, 7-9#
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The Mutiny resulted in
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power steadily becoming concentrated in London, racial
antagonism between the British and Indians, and a dislike
2
among the British for further reform.
The concentration of power in London, racial antagon
ism, and the loss of a sense of mission which was evident
among many Britons in India after the Mutiny did not affect
Sir Bartle Prere.

His attitude was a reflection of his

training in the Sind, where the emphasis had been on indiv
idual initiative and personal relationships with the Indians.
This persuaded him to fight for the governing of British
India in India itself and against racial discrimination in
government.

He opposed, for instance, the ideas of Canning

for realigning his executive council and also the Arms Bill
of 1860.

Prere never lost his sense of mission; this was

reiterated when he lectured to the Indian upper classes and
university students about their responsibilities for India.^
As with public works, however, British administration provided
only the frame of the house; the structure would have to be
built by the Indians themselves.

The British provided the

superior moral and political leadership for the Indians, as
Prere had been taught at the training college at Haileybury.
In summary, the hallmarks of Indian administration as exem
plified by Prere were free trade, individual initiative in
administration,

personal contact with the natives, and

2Supra, 19#

^Supra. 25-28, 31-32.

^Supra, 38-39#

^Supra. 1#

super-
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ior moral and political leadership.

All these factors were

present to one degree or another in the areas— Afghanistan
and Africa— where Prere later took an imperialist stance.
Afghanistan provided the first instance of contention
between the imperialist, or "forward school," and, in this
case, the group favoring status quo headed by John Lawrence.
The problem was how to keep Afghanistan out of Russian hands.
Sir Bartle Prere emphasized two arguments in advocating a
forward policy.

He wanted a British agent to deal personally

with the Afghan ruler and thus reduce the chance of undue
Russian influence on him.

The agent was also to insist on

protection for British commercial interests.

John Lawrence,

on the other hand, favored a less ambitious policy whereby
India would be defended on its own border, if the need arose.
It was essentially the same "imperial vs. anti-imperial"
argument that erupted again when the South African policy
pursued by Prere was attacked by British Liberals.

The major

difference in earlier arguments between Prere and Lawrence
over Afghanistan was that they involved two Indian adminis
trators who were experts in their field.

Their arguments

therefore were of a highly technical nature, the implications
of which did not appear until Lord Lytton became Viceroy and
Governor-General.

By this time Prere was in South Africa,

and events there began to parallel those in Afghanistan,
^Supra, 51-52.

^Supra.

54*

7

no

where the new Viceroy was taking an aggressive stance.

Both

cases were decided on the basis of Indian administrative
experience.
The mission of Sir Bartle Frere to Zanzibar had a
more direct link with India than his service in South AfriGa.
The reason for the mission was the Turkish threat to the
Persian G-ulf, an area the British considered a special sphere
of influence; indirectly it menaced British rule in India
because of the religious significance of the Sultan of
Constantinople.

It was to forestall this threat that colon

ial administrators suggested forcing the Sultan of Zanzibar
to ban the slave trade in his far-flung East African empire.
They sought to reconstruct an old alliance between the
British and the progressive mercantile elements and prevent
o
any intrusion of hostile powers.
The argument made by Frere
that free trade would compensate for the loss of the slave
trade was natural because of his Indian background.

The use

of a consular system to keep the slave trade in check, and
missionary groups to establish personal rapport and advance
civilized behavior among the released slaves was also in
keeping with his Indian experiences.

More important, however,

was his belief in the superior moral and political leadership
of Britain in providing for the advancement of the Africans.
This, in the end, was the basis for his contention that free
^Supra, 60-62.

Ill
/

trade would adequately compensate for abolition of the slave
trade by Zanzibar.
The same basic belief in the superior moral and
political leadership that Britain could provide for uncivil
ized peoples underlay the actions taken by Sir Bartle Prere
which led to the Zulu War.

He expressed the certainty that

he was right in the dispatches he sent back to the Colonial
Q
Office;
if he was not, his entire career had been a waste.
Prere constructed his edifice upon that base.

He envisioned

a British resident able to work on a personal basis with
Cetewayo.1^

An incident such as the dragging of the two

women back across the Natal border by the Zulus gave Prere
a good illustration of the need for such moral and political
leadership.11

G-ladstone was correct in linking events in

Afghanistan and South Africa.

They were cut from the same

cloth, and signaled the rise of the imperialist spirit that
would culminate with such politicians as Joseph Chamberlain.
It was another administrator, Viscount Milner, who, imbued
with the imperial ideal, effectively carried British influence
12
all the way north to the Zambesi.
The inevitable conclusion is that the British Indian
administrator was the decisive factor in the formation of
Victorian imperialism.

Prere had been instrumental in revers

ing British policy in Afghanistan, Eastern Africa, and South
9Sup r a . 98-99.

10Supra. 98.

l:LSupra. 96-97.

12Supra. 105.
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Africa*

The British cleared Afghanistan of Russian influence,

kept East Africa in the British sphere of influence, and
prepared the way for South African confederation.
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